

-JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



AFGHANISTAN: A WAR THAT MUST BE WON VIA THE CONCENTRATION OF
UNITED STATES ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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14. ABSTRACT Out of the dust, smoke, and carnage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks arose a change in American policy towards terrorism and a proclaimed commitment to wage war in Afghanistan. In relatively short order and with a small military and CIA footprint, the United States rapidly toppled Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime. Consequentially, a window of opportunity was created in which the U.S. could employ decisive diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power to achieve strategic success. Strategic success is defined as the creation of a viable Afghanistan representative government and a professional military establishment that can provide fundamental human needs to its people and security within its borders – thereby denying al-Qaeda sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. once again. Six years into the war, the U.S. has yet to concentrate these elements resulting in indecisive operations, a fragile Afghanistan government, and the continuance of a protracted counterinsurgency fight. This paper first demonstrates the moral and legal legitimacy of the U.S.'s decision to wage war using Just War Theory. Next, it addresses the grave threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Movement. The remainder of the paper addresses current DIME initiatives and offers a way ahead to better set conditions for success.					
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ABSTRACT

September 11, 2001 marked the deadliest single day attacks on American soil in United States' history. Out of the dust, smoke, and carnage arose a change in American policy towards terrorism and a proclaimed commitment to wage war in Afghanistan against a determined adversary whose Islamic revolutionary ideology presents a grave threat to United States national interests. In relatively short order, a small United States military and CIA footprint, in concert with the Northern Alliance, toppled the ruling Taliban regime and degraded al-Qaeda command and control. Consequentially, this rapid success created a window of opportunity to employ decisive United States diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power to achieve strategic success. Strategic success is defined as the creation of a viable Afghanistan representative government and a professional military establishment that can provide fundamental human needs to its people and security within its borders – thereby denying al-Qaeda sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. once again. Six years later, the U.S. has yet to concentrate these elements resulting in indecisive operations, a fragile Afghanistan government, and the continuance of a protracted counterinsurgency fight.

This paper first demonstrates the moral and legal legitimacy of the United States' decision to wage war in Afghanistan using the Just War Theory (JWT), and how critical it is in light of the pillars of its National Security Strategy. Next, the paper addresses the grave threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRM). JWT, coupled with the severity of the IRM, require the concentration of U.S. elements of national power to achieve victory. The remainder of the paper addresses current DIME initiatives and offers a way ahead to better set conditions for success.

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Introduction

September 11, 2001 marked the deadliest single day attacks on American soil in United States' (U.S.) history. Out of the dust, smoke, and carnage arose a change in American policy towards terrorism and a proclaimed commitment to wage war against a determined adversary whose radical Islamic ideology presents a clear threat to its national interests. This policy would first manifest itself in the distant, rugged, and war-torn country of Afghanistan. 110 Central Intelligence Agency operatives and 316 U.S. Army Special Operations Forces rapidly affected link-up with the Northern Alliance, fought side by side against Taliban strongholds in concert with uncontested U.S. Air Force precision strikes and close air support, and within weeks toppled the existing Taliban regime and its brutal stranglehold on Afghanistan's population. The U.S. had indeed achieved its first tactical and operational successes in its war on terrorism. Consequentially, this rapid success created a window of opportunity to employ its diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national power to achieve strategic success via the creation of a viable Afghanistan representative government and a professional military establishment that can provide fundamental human needs to its people and security within its borders.

Six years later, the U.S. in concert with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghanistan partners, finds itself deeply rooted in a struggle to defeat a determined and violent Taliban insurgency and strengthen a vulnerable Afghanistan government that is still in its infancy and vying for its survival. Barnett R. Ruben, a leading expert on Afghanistan and Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation of New York University championed this argument in 2006

and offered that “Stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan have been overshadowed by developments in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. This overshadowing detracts from the achievements in Afghanistan since 2001, including completion of the benchmarks in the Bonn Agreement (December 2001)...Moreover, the security situation has deteriorated significantly, and long-term stability in Afghanistan remains elusive.”¹

In March 2006, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the antigovernment insurgency in Afghanistan is growing and presents a greater threat than “at any point since late 2001.”²

In a just war that must be won as an extension of American policy toward global terrorism, the diplomatic signaling it represents on the world stage, and the Government’s ultimate responsibility to protect its citizens, the U.S. has yet to concentrate its elements of national power to set the conditions for victory. Instead, the war in Afghanistan has been overshadowed by the political impetus placed on Iraq reconstruction and its complex security dilemma and thereby relegated to an economy of force campaign where decisiveness and ultimate victory are essential to protect and advance U.S. vital national interests.

The thesis of this paper is that *Afghanistan is a unique and just war that can only be won via the well-orchestrated concentration of United States’ elements of national power.*

¹ Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, CSR NO. 12 (March 2006): v.

² Walter Pincus, “Growing Threat Seen in Afghan Insurgency: Defense Intelligence Agency Chief Cites Surging violence in Homeland,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2006.

Jus Ad Bellum – Afghanistan and Just War Tradition

The emphasis placed on the protection and advancement of vital national interests is nested within the National Security Strategy of the U.S. of America and founded upon two pillars:

“The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies...Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom. The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies...Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems...America must continue to lead.”¹

U.S. efforts to take the lead in exporting and promoting democratization while working to end tyranny and prosecuting its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) present an arduous undertaking, and one that requires both domestic and international support. Domestic support is paramount to sustain U.S. resolve in terms of persistence and resources. Without international support, the U.S. could be – and often is through its adversaries’ eyes and the lenses of several countries – portrayed as a hegemonic power with self absorbed tendencies and agendas that are inconsistent and incompatible with the underpinnings of the aforementioned pillars of its National Security Strategy.

Just War Theory in Support of Vital National Interests

“America is a Nation with a mission - and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace - a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman.” George W. Bush

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George Bush declared war against global terrorist networks and state actors that support them. This declaration, coupled

¹ U.S. President. National Security Strategy, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 16, 2006, Preamble by President George W. Bush.

with the tenets of democratization outlined in his National Security Strategy, placed the U.S. on a world stage of grand and noble ideas – and in the eyes of its adversaries, a kinetic and non-kinetic clash of civilizations with considerable ideological differences.

In light of this war of ideas, it is imperative that the U.S. adheres to Just War Theory to maintain its moral high ground while prosecuting its War on Terrorism. Failure to do so can quite easily lead to a lack of support and will of the American people, diplomatic challenges in the international arena, deteriorating support of friends and allies, and fuel for the ideological foundations of its adversaries. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would likely argue this assertion as outlined in his post 9-11 Thoughts on Terrorism memorandum dated September 19, 2001. He suggested that “The legitimacy of our actions does not depend on how many countries support us. More nearly the opposite is true: the legitimacy of other countries’ opinions should be judged by their attitude toward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life.”² While it is certainly understandable that the President of the U.S. is ultimately responsible for the security of the American people and their defense is of utmost importance, in today’s battlefield of ideas, international and coalition support are critical in standing behind the U.S. in pursuit of democratization, its inherent values, and its continuing endeavors in the protracted War on Terrorism.

Arguably, the U.S. cannot stand alone in this fight without becoming entrenched in what Sun Tzu referred to as protracted campaigns which drain the treasury, exhaust ones forces, and lose the support of the population. “No country has ever benefited from

² U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Thoughts on Terrorism Memorandum*, by Donald Rumsfeld. Washington D.C., September 19, 2001, 3:13 PM.

a protracted war.”³ Furthermore, Clausewitz stated that war is “merely the continuation of policy by other means,”⁴ and he acknowledged the importance of alliances and associated agreements between nations for the protection of self interests. Only when two nations share a common interest, will an alliance succeed to its fullest potential. During World War II, Sir Winston Churchill understood and embraced the significance of alliances to achieve victory in Europe and an acceptable peace and articulated that the “only thing in war worse than having to fight with allies is having to fight without allies.” The 2006 National Security Strategy states that the U.S. must “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.”⁵ Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated that international support, even among some historic European allies, has waned as a result of what some perceive as an unjust war in light of Iraqis possessing no weapons of mass destruction or clearly identifiable linkages to al-Qaeda. Just War Theory matters. In fact, it is as relevant, if not more so, than in any period in history.

Just War Theory Defined

Just War Theory (JWT) is defined as the justification of how and why wars are fought, and this justification has dominated the study of numerous military theorists, theologians, and philosophers throughout the ages. JWT was “developed in the West

³ Samuel B. Griffith and B.H. Liddell Hart. *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*, ed. Sun Tzu, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, forward by B.H. Liddell Hart (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41.

⁴ Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *Carl von Clausewitz, On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 99.

⁵ U.S. President. National Security Strategy, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 16, 2006: 1.

over nearly two millennium (and) seeks to place moral restraints on warfare...”⁶ Without such restraints, warfare would not be bound by morality and the object of warfare would be dominated by human tendencies in which Clausewitz articulated as “a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force...”⁷ The U.S.’ position on JWT finds its origins in Christian theology and natural law theory. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) was perhaps the first to offer the tenets of today’s JWT, and “while loathing the destruction and loss of life that attend war, Augustine nonetheless believed that a “just war” might be preferable to an unjust peace...(furthermore he offered) the use of force is necessary – though always regrettable – in a fallen world to restrain evil, but that its ultimate goal must be to restore peace.”⁸ Since Augustine, JWT has evolved with warfare traditions over the last 1,600 years. Though rooted in Christian theology, JWT often manifests itself today in international laws that govern the moral and ethical conduct of armed conflict, such as the Geneva Conventions which govern the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war. These international laws are rooted in the charters and ethical foundations of various international institutions to include the United Nations (U.N.) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, the U.N. Charter states that its assembled nations are determined to:

“save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small...[and] to establish conditions under

⁶ The PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Just War Tradition”, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. <http://pewforum.org/issues> (accessed 08 January 2008).

⁷ Howard and Paret, 89.

⁸ The PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life.

which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained...⁹

In an effort to add greater fidelity to JWT, historical and modern day theorists and the legal community writ large have created a plethora of criteria that govern both the moral justification for waging war in the first place – Jus ad Bellum – and the way in which war is conducted – Jus in Bello.¹⁰ Though Jus in Bello is crucial in waging war in concert with U.S. political goals and objectives, this research offers a critical analysis of Jus ad Bellum to establish the justice of waging war in Afghanistan. In the U.S., the decision for ultimately going to war rests with the National Command Authority and the Congress. The criteria it and the international community most routinely examine as a litmus test for adhering to JWT include legitimate authority, public declaration, last resort, reasonable hope of success, just intent, and just cause. Each of these criteria will be examined in the following paragraphs. Although JWT criteria are certainly open to debate due to the complex nature and opposing views of morality and justice, the war in Afghanistan meets the JWT construct.

Criteria #1: Legitimate Authority ✓

Legitimate authority “restricts the number of agents who may authorize use of force.”¹¹ This restriction stemmed from the Middle Ages when local war lords and their private armies would wage war without consulting with, let alone receiving authorization from, their national sovereign. In today’s American framework, unresolved tensions remain between the President as Commander-in-Chief and the authority of Congress to

⁹ United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations.” <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed 11 March 2008).

¹⁰ Martin L. Cook, “Ethical Issues in War: An Overview”, *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 2d Edition, Chapter 3(June 2006): 103.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 104.

declare war. The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, allows the President to use military forces for 60 days, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, and grants an additional 30 days upon a formal request by the President, regardless of Congress's agreement with the request. Congressional authorization can be found in Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution which grants Congress the power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

Regardless of the aforementioned unresolved tensions, the President and Congress have found pragmatic solutions in every deployment of American forces to include Afghanistan. "After September 11, the Bush Administration rejected the previous approach to counter-terrorism, which had employed the combined tools of diplomatic cooperation, economic sanctions, and internationally-coordinated law enforcement measures. Instead, the President declared in the aftermath of September 11 that the U.S. was engaged in a *war* on terrorism."¹² In fact, as early as 8:30 p.m. on September 11, 2001, President Bush addressed the American people and stated that "America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism."¹³ Days following the attacks of 9/11, Presidential advisors informed the New York Times that the Administration was considering renaming the GWOT. Initially unaware of this discussion with the press, President Bush quickly responded and "publically overruled his top advisors, saying,

¹²U.S. President. The White House, "President Launches Education Partnership with Muslim Nations," The White House Press Release, *Remarks by the President to the Students and Faculty at Thurgood* (October 25, 2001).

¹³U.S. President. The White House, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," The White House Press Release, *President Bush address to the American People* (September 11 2001).

“Make no mistake about it, we are at war.”¹⁴ Since that time President Bush has remained consistent with a declaration of war as referenced in myriad speeches, national security documents, and Presidential Directives. Furthermore, Congress publically offered its support.

On September 18, 2001, “after negotiation with the President and significant debate, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the U.S. by such nations, organizations, or persons.”¹⁵ Congress echoed the sentiment of the American who offered unprecedented support to the President following the 9/11 attacks. Gallup, CBS News, and the New York Times polls determined that President Bush received approximately 50% support following his inauguration. Following his declaration of war on terror with specific emphasis placed on defeating Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, his approval ratings rose to 85% across America – an extraordinary percentage in light of a bifurcated Nation during and immediately following a tight Presidential race and election.¹⁶ With Congressional support and the American people standing behind his declaration, President Bush engaged the international community prior to commencing military

¹⁴Richard W. Stevenson, “President Makes it Clear: Phrase is ‘War on Terror,’” *New York Times*, August 4, 2005.

¹⁵ Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith. “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” *Duke Law*, Spring 2005.
www.law.duke.edu/magazine/2005Spring/features/bradley.html?linker=2. (accessed January 3, 2008).

¹⁶ BBC News, Special Reports, 629. “Bush Approval Rating Tracker, 2001-2005.”
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/6038436.stm>. (accessed December 15, 2007)

operations. Most world leaders were appalled of the tragic events of 9/11 and publically denounced the horrific attacks on innocent noncombatants. On September 12th, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1368 condemning the attacks as “horrificing,” labeling them a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirming the “inherent right of self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the U.N.”¹⁷ Additionally, after a classified briefing on October 2, Lord Robertson, the secretary general of NATO, declared that the evidence linking al-Qaeda to September 11 provided the factual basis for invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Article 5 states:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the U.N., will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹⁸

Finally, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution on October 16 stating “the [U.S.] measures...in the exercise of [its] inherent right of individual and collective self-defense have the full support of the states parties to the Rio Treaty.”¹⁹ In the final analysis, the international community writ large, with the exception of several countries to include Iraq, Malaysia, North Korea, and Syria, supported the U.S.’ military intervention in Afghanistan.

¹⁷ “United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1368 (2001),” *Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th Meeting* (12 September 2001).

¹⁸ NATO. “NATO and the Scourge on Terrorism. What is Article 5?”
<http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm> (accessed November 13, 2007)

¹⁹ “Organization of American States,” *24th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Terrorist Threat to the Americas* (September 21, 2001).

Criteria #2: Public Declaration ✓

Public declaration has both a legal and moral purpose prior to a declaration of war and the subsequent use of military force. The legal purpose pertains to the role of the President and Congress in declaring war as presented in the previous section. Moral purpose is defined as:

“the requirement for delivery of an ultimatum before initiation of hostilities. This requirement gives a potential adversary formal notice that the issue at hand is judged serious enough to warrant the use of military force, and that the nation is prepared to do so unless that issue is resolved successfully and peacefully immediately.”²⁰

Within the international community, ultimatums are generally recognized as a political dialogue between two or more recognized governments. The U.S. Government found itself in a unique 21st Century political dilemma with respect to the deliverance of an ultimatum to a non-state global terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, and a brutal and fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan that was not officially recognized by the U.S. or U.N. The al-Qaeda and Taliban linkages and threats to vital national interests will shortly be addressed in the “just cause” argument of Just War Theory. For the purposes of this argument, however, the U.S.’ Intelligence Community clearly established that al-Qaeda operatives and leadership planned the 9-11 terrorist attacks from Afghanistan and enjoyed Taliban-provided sanctuary and extended hospitality. In an effort to communicate with the Taliban regime, the President worked through the Pakistani government as an effective means of communication while signaling that he would not open a political dialogue with a non-recognized government who willingly harbored al-Qaeda terrorists. The Pakistani government maintained diplomatic relations

²⁰ Cook, 105.

with the Taliban, hence the U.S. used this relationship to issue a series of demands. These demands were set forth publicly on September 20, 2001 during a Presidential address to a joint session of Congress and the American people. President Bush declared that:

“The leadership of al-Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al-Qaeda’s vision for the world...By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. ..And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”²¹

In the weeks to follow, the Taliban regime articulated a “no-negotiations” stance yet expressed a desire to resolve the matter. Growing impatient of its refusal to meet his demands, President Bush issued a final public warning for full compliance on October 6, 2001. The following day, the U.S. and United Kingdom launched the first phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, consisting of airstrikes against both al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. The scope and nature of the campaign quickly expanded to encompass ground and maritime operations. As required by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the U.S. promptly notified the Security Council that it was acting in individual and collective self-defense. In the report, the U.S. asserted that it had clear and compelling information that the al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had

²¹ U.S. President. The White House, “Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” The White House Press Release, (September 20 2001).

a central role in the attacks and that there was an ongoing threat made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by al-Qaeda as a base of operations. The purpose of the military operations was to prevent and deter further attacks on the U.S.

Criteria #3: Last Resort ✓

The last resort criterion of Just War Theory “acknowledges that the actual commencement of armed conflict crosses a decisive line. Diplomatic solutions to end conflicts, even if they are less than perfect, are to be preferred to military ones in most, if not all, cases.”²² This premise draws a parallel to Sun Tzu’s philosophy of war in which he stated that “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”²³ In more recent history, U.S. political and military senior leadership examined its military failures in Vietnam with respect to achieving policy objectives via the military arm of national power. Subsequent analysis and speculation resulted in the pre-decisional criteria for the employment of military power in the future and assisted in the formulation of the Weinberger Doctrine.

In remarks to the Washington Press Club on 28 November 1984, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed six criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military force was warranted. The sixth criterion clearly stated that “the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.”²⁴

²² Cook, 105.

²³ Griffith and Hart, 77.

²⁴ Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense* '85 (January 1985): 10.

One could present an argument that the political climate under the Bush Administration has fostered a propensity to employ the military element of national power without ample consideration of the “last resort” constraint. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, then Secretary of State Colin Powell recommended to the President that the introduction of military forces be delayed until diplomacy had a chance to work. Specifically, Secretary Powell supported the issuance of economic sanctions and additional time for U.N. weapons inspectors to complete their inspections. In Secretary Powell’s estimation, Saddam Hussein understood the implications of economic sanctions on his country and could indeed be coerced via diplomatic channels as witnessed in previous sanctions following the Gulf War. Notwithstanding, President Bush, with the advice of Vice President Cheney and then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, denied further diplomatic solution sets and authorized the rapid employment of military force. As a result, international support for the war in Iraq was negatively affected, and China, France, and Russia were quick to publically declare that the war was clearly not a last resort. Furthermore, a 2003 New York Times and CBS News Poll taken in the U.S. determined that 59% of Americans desired to give the U.N. and weapons inspectors more time before the use of military force.²⁵ The war in Afghanistan, on the other hand, presents a clearer case of adhering to the “last resort” criterion. First and foremost, one must take into consideration that Afghanistan was being ruled by a Taliban regime that was not recognized as an official government within the international community with the exception of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Hence, the U.S. and

²⁵ Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, “Threats and Responses: The Poll; More Americans now Faulting U.N. on Iraq, Poll Finds,” *The New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

the U.N. did not place emphasis on diplomatic measures traditionally taken between state entities.

Second, al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization, and the U.S. has clearly articulated in its national policy over the last 20 years that it does not negotiate with terrorists. President Bush echoed this policy and even went so far as to state that “No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.”²⁶ The U.N. acknowledges this unyielding position and though it seeks peaceful solutions to the terrorist threat, it offers that “political and diplomatic action to resolve situations should in no way be interpreted as negotiating with terrorists. Terrorists can only be brought to justice – there could be no negotiating with them.”²⁷

Third, economic sanctions and diplomacy have proven ineffective and counter to the ideological and religious underpinnings of the al-Qaeda terrorist movement. Their movement does not present a traditional “state versus state” security dilemma but rather a war of ideas and beliefs that derive from Allah himself. This is not to claim, however, that the U.S. did not attempt, pre-9/11, to employ its diplomatic element of national power to get the Taliban to expel Bin Laden to a country where he could face justice and to discontinue its role as a sanctuary for global terrorist networks. Although President Bush effectively dismissed further diplomatic maneuvers and ordered the employment of combat operations shortly after the attacks, he understood that diplomacy had been given a chance to take root from the spring of 1997 to early September 2001. The efforts

²⁶ U.S. President. The White House, “President to Send Secretary Powell to the Middle East,” The White House Press Release (April 4, 2002).

²⁷ “United Nations General Assembly, GA/9964, 13,11,2001,” Fifty-sixth General Assembly, Plenary 51st meeting, While Focus on Terrorism Warranted, World’s Economic, Social, Political, Humanitarian Concerns Need Attention, General Assembly Told (November 13, 2001).

employed inducements, warnings, and sanctions, and they all failed to compel the Taliban.

In 1997, Department of State officials requested permission from the Taliban to visit militant camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership denied State Department entry and shortly thereafter then Secretary Albright publically announced the Taliban's mistreatment of women and numerous of human rights violations, referring to them as "despicable."²⁸ In response to these allegations, a Taliban delegation visited Washington D.C. in December 1997 and offered little to counter them. In April 1998, U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson led a delegation to Afghanistan and in light of Bin Laden's recently published February 1998 fatwa (a legal statement in Islam, issued by a religious leader – mufti – or a religious lawyer) against Americans, asked the Taliban to turn Bin Laden over to the U.S.²⁹ The Taliban refused his terms and stated that Bin Laden did not pose a threat to the U.S. Diplomatic alternatives remained open, and the U.S. engaged Saudi Arabia in an effort to persuade the Taliban.

The Saudi Monarchy considered Bin Laden an enemy to its country as Saudi Arabia was also the recipient of a 1996 Bin Laden fatwa in which he fiercely denounced its rulers. In the spring of 1998, the Saudi government successfully disrupted a major plot in which Bin Laden planned to attack U.S. forces in the Kingdom. President Clinton seized the opportunity to work more closely with the Saudi's in response to a growing terrorist threat, and "Crown Prince Abdullah agreed to make an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Laden for eventual delivery to the U.S. or another

²⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Diplomacy, Staff Statement No. 5*, Washington D.C. :7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

country.”³⁰ After subsequent Saudi discussions with Mullah Omar, the ruler of the Taliban regime, Omar vehemently denounced Saudi leadership. In response the Saudi government ended all relations with the Taliban, recalled its diplomats from Kandahar, and expelled Taliban representatives from the Kingdom.³¹ In response to this failed diplomatic effort, the Department of State’s Counterterrorism Coordinator, Michael Sheehan, warned the Taliban of “dire consequences if Bin Laden was not expelled. Moreover, if there was any further attack, he and others warned, the Taliban would be held directly accountable, including the possibility of a military assault by the U.S.”³² Bin Laden remained in Afghanistan.

“From 1999 through early 2001, the United States also pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban’s only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these efforts to persuade the UAE achieved little before 9/11.”³³ Also in July 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order that declared the Taliban regime as a sponsor of terrorism. In October of the same year, the U.N. published UN Security Council Resolution 1267 which stated the following:

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Insists that the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, comply promptly with its previous resolutions and in particular cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice;

³⁰ Ibid., 8.

³¹ Ibid., 9.

³² Ibid., 9.

³³ Ibid., 10.

2. Demands that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice...

3. Decides further that, in order to enforce paragraph 2 above, all States shall:

(a) Deny permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation such as the performance of the Hajj;

(b) Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need...³⁴

“None of this had any visible effect on Mullah Omar [Leader of the Taliban], an illiterate leader who was unconcerned about commerce with the outside world. Omar had no diplomatic contact with the West, since he refused to meet with non-Muslims.”³⁵ As a final measure of diplomacy, the U.S. requested and gained United Nation’s support for even broader sanctions to include an embargo on arms sales to the Taliban. UN Security Council Resolution 1333 followed suit, yet again, the embargo had little visible effect.³⁶

In the final analysis, the U.S. did employ considerable diplomatic measures to resolve the Taliban and Bin Laden security dilemma before 9/11. While it is true that

³⁴ “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, S/RES/1267 (1999),” *Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st Meeting* (15 October 2001).

³⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Diplomacy, Staff Statement No. 5*, Washington D.C.: 10.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

President Bush chose not to engage in further diplomatic efforts after the 9/11 attacks, one can surmise that he was aware of previous efforts – all of which failed to achieve desired effects. Perhaps then Secretary of State Albright best summarized U.S. diplomatic efforts with the Taliban and lack of progress by her statement that “we had to do something. “In the end,” she said, “it didn’t work. But we did in fact try to use all the tools we had.”³⁷

Criteria #4: Reasonable Chance of Success ✓

The reasonable chance of success criterion of JWT is certainly more intangible and susceptible to a perspective of degree than the other JWT criteria, but it is designed to focus on one fundamental question. “If you are going to do all that damage (in war) and cause death, are you likely to get what you want as a result?”³⁸ In other words, does military intervention set the conditions for achieving one’s political end state or does it present a policy – strategy mismatch.

One could argue that if the aim of the U.S.’ GWOT is the complete elimination of terrorism, the aim will likely never be achieved. However, the object of going to war in Afghanistan was to prevent its Taliban regime from harboring Bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives and to deny a known terrorist sanctuary that provided a safe haven for planning the 9/11 attacks. It is reasonable to deduce that the employment of U.S. military forces could offer a solution to these limited objectives, and in fact, have realized many of them throughout the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. Examples include the removal of the Taliban regime, a significant disruption of the al-Qaeda network and loss of its credibility due to the swiftness of the Taliban collapse, and deterrence – to some

³⁷ Ibid., 10.

³⁸ Cook, 106.

degree – of future attacks planned from within Afghanistan's borders. The introduction of U.S. military forces indeed proved to present a logical course of action for the Bush Administration. Diplomacy had clearly not achieved desired results, and one could argue that combating terrorism through a criminal construct and with limited missile strikes during the previous Clinton Administration proved ineffective as well.

During his tenure, President Clinton empowered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take the lead in combating terrorism efforts as the logical law enforcement agency to bring justice to terrorists through a criminal-judiciary construct. Clinton's terrorism focus was reflected in his 1995 State of the Union Address where he promised comprehensive legislation to strengthen the U.S. ability in combating terrorists, whether they strike at home or abroad. In February of the same year, he sent Congress proposals to extend federal criminal jurisdiction, to make it easier to deport terrorists, and to act against terrorist fund raising. The Clinton Administration generally maintained this criminalization paradigm throughout its tenure, and chose never employed the full military might of the U.S. even in light of identified al-Qaeda plots and operations to include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 Embassy bombings in the East African cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, and the 2000 attack of the USS Cole in Yemen. In fact, the only U.S. limited military response followed the 1998 Embassy bombings in which President Clinton authorized Operation Infinite Reach.

This 20 August 1998 operation involved the launching of 75 Tomahawk cruise missiles into a suspected terrorist camp in Khowst, Afghanistan in which Bin Laden may have been located, and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that was suspected of being a

weapons of mass destruction manufacturing or storage facility for al-Qaeda. Battle damage assessments revealed little tactical or operational success as Bin Laden was not killed, and the destruction of the pharmaceutical plant caused collateral damage that enraged many within the Muslim community. General Zinni, former Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, was deeply concerned with the missile strikes in Afghanistan and the potential for unintended civilian casualties. Furthermore, he stated that “It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there.”³⁹

Exacerbating matters, Bin Laden capitalized on the long-range missile strikes and firmly believed that they represented the true character of the U.S. and its unwillingness to commit ground forces because of casualty aversion and a lack of resolve. He also stated that he wanted “Americans to proceed to Afghanistan, where all their misconceptions and illusions will be removed. I am sure, however, that the Americans will not come because they are cowards. They attack (with soldiers) only the unarmed and weaker peoples.”⁴⁰

In fairness to the Clinton Administration, it did consider a full range of military options in response to the al-Qaeda threat and acknowledged the importance of deterring, defeating, and responding vigorously to all terrorist attacks on its territory and against its citizens as outlined in President Clinton’s June 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 39. A lack of detailed and accurate intelligence surrounding Bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda operatives’ whereabouts, coupled with the political climate in America at the time and talk of President Clinton’s potential impeachment, resulted in no military intervention following Operation Infinite Reach. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S.

³⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Military, Staff Statement No. 6*, Washington D.C.: 7.

⁴⁰ Anonymous Author. *Though Our Enemies’ Eyes Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 155.

acknowledged the lack of American appetite for war during the Clinton Administration, and offer that “neither Congress nor the American public would have supported large-scale military operations in Afghanistan before the shock of 9/11.”⁴¹

Regardless of this conjecture, U.S.’ failed diplomatic measures with the Taliban regime, its unwillingness to invest in American bloodshed to counter the al-Qaeda threat, and its treatment of the threat through a criminal paradigm, had not produced positive results against a determined, capable, and lethal enemy. Time will tell if the declaration of war and subsequent employment of military force will ultimately defeat the al-Qaeda and Taliban threat in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, it does present a viable means to succeed where other means have clearly failed. Failure is not an option, as a future 9/11-like attack upon the U.S. is unacceptable and inconsistent with its government’s responsibility to provide for the common defense of its people, as forged in the Constitution of the U.S. During President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address he stated, “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism more as a crime -- a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted, tried, convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September 11th, it is not enough to serve our

⁴¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Military, Staff Statement No. 6*, Washington D.C.: 12.

enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the U.S. – and war is what they got.”⁴²

Criteria #5: Just Intent ✓

The just intent criterion of JWT serves to keep the war aims limited and within the context of the rationale for going to war in the first place. As a general rule, the “purpose of the war must be to restore the status quo antebellum – the state of affairs that existed before the violation that provided the war’s just cause.”⁴³ Just wars are not waged for resources or what may be construed by the international community as ulterior, self-serving motives such as securing access to oil reserves or simply acting out of revenge.

In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. demonstrated the just intent criterion as its purpose was the removal of an oppressive Taliban regime that denied its people fundamental human rights and willingly harbored al-Qaeda leadership and operatives. President Bush clearly articulated to the international community and the American people that the war in Afghanistan was not against Islam nor was it against the people of Afghanistan.

“Afghanistan's people have been brutalized -- many are starving and many have fled... The United States respects the people of Afghanistan -- after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid -- but we condemn the Taliban regime.”⁴⁴

These remarks, coupled with a multitude of other policy statements, demonstrated that a declaration of war and subsequent regime change in Afghanistan presented a much higher calling than a parochial response of retaliation or revenge following the 9/11 attacks.

⁴² U.S. President. The White House, “State of the Union Speech,” The White House Press Release (January 20, 2004).

⁴³ Cook, 105.

⁴⁴ U.S. President. The White House, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” The White House Press Release (September 20, 2001).

Regime change presented a legal challenge for the U.N. since it was not covered by international law. Self-defense however was recognized and encapsulated in its security resolutions. The U.N. offered tacit support for the Taliban regime change as a logical linkage to the U.S.' self-defense motives based on Taliban and al-Qaeda relations. Though one could argue that regime change is illegal because it is not recognized by international law, regime change, in the case of Afghanistan, not only met the self-defense legal right of the U.S., but it offered a better way of life for the people of Afghanistan. It is also worth noting that the U.N. helped forge the bi-product of the regime change – the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Under U.N. auspices in Bonn, Afghan notables assembled on December 5, 2001 and endorsed an 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government'. The signatories recognized the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented and noted that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time.⁴⁵ The U.N. endorsed this Bonn agreement and unanimously adopted Security Resolution 1383 which pledged its full support in working with the interim authority which took office on December 22, 2001.⁴⁶ In the final

⁴⁵ United States Institute of Peace. "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions."
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/afghanistan/pa_afghan_12052001.html (accessed November 1, 2007)

⁴⁶ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1383, (2001)," *Security Council Endorses Afghanistan Agreement on Interim Arrangements Signed Yesterday in Bonn, 4434th Meeting* (15 October 2001).

analysis, the U.N. embraced the removal of the Taliban regime and helped set conditions for the birth of a representative Afghanistan government. While the U.S. certainly caused the removal of the Taliban regime, it did not replace it with a pre-identified shadow government designed to serve as an extension of U.S. hegemony.

Criteria #6: Just Cause ✓

The final JWT criterion addressed in this paper, just cause, “asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war.”⁴⁷ While causes for going to war have differed over time, it is generally accepted by modern just war theorists that States are justified for going to war in response to aggression received. In fact, direct attacks on the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an internationally recognized State provide a clear case for just cause as codified in the U.N. Charter. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter acknowledges the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and at eleven o’clock on the morning of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration announced that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Subsequent investigations lead to the conclusion that Bin Laden was the mastermind behind the attacks, and that he was hiding in Afghanistan under the protection of the ruling Taliban regime. President Bush, on the evening of 9/11, announced that the U.S. will bring those responsible to justice and that “we will make no distinction between those who committed these acts and those that harbor them.”⁴⁸

Bringing terrorists to justice drew little fanfare in the international community, as the concept was widely accepted and endorsed. The U.N. however found itself in

⁴⁷ Cook, 104.

⁴⁸ U.S. President. The White House, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,” The White House Press Release (September 11, 2001).

unchartered territory in which a nation state – the U.S. – was about to enter a war in a sovereign country – Afghanistan – that was providing sanctuary to a non-state actor within its borders – Bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives. While international law continues to struggle with this construct, there were undeniable linkages between Bin Laden and the Taliban. First and foremost, Bin Laden is a hero-figure in the eyes of the Taliban Regime because of his role as a facilitator, engineer, fighter, and visionary in the Afghan – Soviet War from 1979-1989. There is certainly a degree of controversy within the Western World, surrounding Bin Laden’s primacy in the war. While some believe that Bin Laden’s contribution rested merely on his personal wealth and vigor, or irrational behavior that can come with youth, the Taliban recall him as a holy man, who left his palace and associated creature comforts to live, fight, and eat alongside his Afghan peasants and Arab fighters.⁴⁹ Bin Laden also used his engineering prowess and wealth to build extensive shelters, roads, trenches, bunkers, and hospitals for mujahedin fighters⁵⁰. Later in the war, he would provide financial aid for the construction of many training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan which served not only to train militant jihadists on war fighting skills but also as a safe haven to proliferate spiritual education and indoctrination – a safe haven that would ultimately serve as a breeding ground for his al-Qaeda movement. In the final analysis, the Taliban Regime revere Bin Laden as an ambassador and revolutionist in the Muslim jihad against the Soviet Union and via his

⁴⁹ Anonymous Author. *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 98.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 95-96.

follower's outcry of Allah Akbar (God is Great), had decidedly defeated the global "superpower myth."⁵¹

In addition to a debt of gratitude the Taliban feel about Bin Laden's role in the defeat of the Soviet Union, and later with his assistance in fighting the Northern Alliance and bringing the Taliban to rule in 1996, one must also understand that it would counter Afghan culture to turn him over to the U.S. or any other entity for that matter. The "Taliban, like all Afghans but especially the [Pashtun Tribe], believe hospitality to a guest is a top-rank moral and Islamic responsibility and that they are obligated to protect a guest with their lives, even if he is tainted."⁵² Bin Laden was certainly aware of this obligation which permeated the Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime, and knew that it would never hand him over to the Americans.

Failed U.S. diplomatic efforts in gaining Taliban capitulation and the deliverance of Bin Laden into custody, coupled with an enduring Taliban debt of gratitude and cultural sensitivities surrounding Bin Laden, presented the Bush Administration little recourse but to introduce a military response. This calculated response was solidified by a final, and arguably the most central just cause criterion in waging war in Afghanistan campaign – the revolutionary Islamic movement and its calamitous threat to the U.S. and its vital national interests.

⁵¹ Ibid., 89.

⁵² Ibid., 154.

The Islamic Revolutionary Movement – A Declaration of War Against the U.S.

In February 1998, then 40-year old Usama Bin Laden, his second in command, Ayman al Zawahiri, and three other signatories issued a fatwa through an Arabic newspaper in London, declaring that the U.S. had made a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims through its policies in the Islamic world. These powerful words were designed to strike at the heart of all believers in Allah to defend against the “Great Satan,” – the U.S. of America. Furthermore, Bin Laden called on all Muslims, in compliance with Allah’s order, to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – for it...

“is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together, and fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God.”¹

Bin Laden announced to the Muslim world that after faith, its highest priority was to “repel the incursive enemy [U.S.] which corrupts religion and the world...We are all servants of God, praise and glory be to Him, and he has prescribed for us killing and fighting...The Muslim masses are moving towards liberating the Muslim worlds. Allah willing, we will win.”² Three months following his fatwa, when interviewed in Afghanistan by ABC-TV, Bin Laden provided greater fidelity to his fatwa themes. He proclaimed that it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels, and that “it is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to

¹ World Islamic Front Statement. “Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans”. World Islamic Front Statement. <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm>. (accessed 24 October 2007)

² Osama Bin Laden, John Miller, 28 May 1998, ABC News, Afghanistan.

squander his efforts on other activities.”³ Bin Laden made it a point not to differentiate between the killing of American soldiers or civilians; in fact, he considered them all to be valid targets in the “holy war” against the U.S. This is a difficult and brutal construct for Americans and most westerners to comprehend, but it is important to understand that Bin Laden and many other Islamic revolutionaries consider their acts of war to be just in accordance with the word of Allah as written in the Qur’an and by the actions of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Although the Qur’an refers to women, children, and the elderly as “innocents” or “protected ones” there are caveats which are embraced by Islamic revolutionaries. In Major Stephen P. Lambert’s thesis, The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, an anonymous Muslim theologian provided a written account of the Prophet Muhammad’s personal and boundless fight against the infidels. “...he abducted them...he plundered their merchant caravans...he assassinated their leaders...he burned their land...[and] he destroyed their fortifications.”⁴ The scholar went on to write that...

“the sanctity of the blood of women, children, and the elderly from among the people of Dar Al-Harb [land of war] is not absolute” and, according to the Qur’an, it is permitted to kill them:

- in order to repay them in kind;
- in the event that they cannot be differentiated from the warriors or fortifications that are being attacked;
- if they are aiding the fighting in deed, word, opinion, or any other way;
- if there is a need to burn the enemy fields or fortifications in order to weaken the enemy’s strength, to breach the ramparts, or topple the country [in other words, if victory demands the application of massive force against the enemy’s resolve];
- if there is a need to use heavy weapons that cannot differentiate between combatants and non-combatants;
- if the enemy uses women and children as human shields; and

³ PBS Frontline Broadcast. “Hunting Bin Ladin.” PBS.
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html (accessed 30 September 2007).

⁴ Contemporary Islamist Ideology Permitting Genocidal Murder

- if the enemy has an agreement with Muslims, and the enemy violates that agreement, non-combatants may be killed to make an example of them.”⁵

The aforementioned justifications are certainly vulnerable to broad interpretation and, similar to the Realism school of theology. It is unproblematic to justify the killing of non-combatants as long as it is for a higher purpose as determined by Allah himself.

The Preeminence of Islam

While it is clear that al-Qaeda has declared war against its greatest adversary, the U.S. and its people, it is important to recognize that al-Qaeda’s stated objectives do not end with America’s defeat or demise. Bin Laden and his operatives consider themselves to be revolutionaries or freedom fighters, as opposed to the terrorist stigma that permeates American society. As revolutionaries, they aspire to ensure that Islam is the prevailing religion in the world and that all Muslims fight the nonbelievers “until there is no persecution and the religion is Allah’s (Surah 2:193). Bin Laden professes that after the infidels have been expelled from the land of Islam, he foresees the overthrow of current regimes throughout the Muslim world and the establishment of one united government strictly enforcing Sharia, or Islamic law. Moreover, he envisions a caliphate (Islamic rule led by a successor of the Prophet Muhammad) reaching from Southeast Asia through the Middle East to the fringes of Western Europe and enveloping Africa. This government would then possess the majority of the world’s proven oil reserves and the nuclear bomb, and Bin Laden has publically stated that he would consider it a sin not to acquire weapons of mass destruction to achieve the will of Allah.”⁶ One should consider the

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Donald S. Cunningham, “Is America on the Road to Victory in the Global War on Terrorism?” Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School Thesis submission, 2006: 19.

establishment of this caliphate as a temporary stasis until Islamic world order can be actualized. In short, today's "holy war" in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Algeria, the Philippines, and other tumultuous regions throughout the world will not end until all nations and all people are placed under the submission of Allah and when his laws reign supreme.

The preponderance of counterarguments against the insurgent nature of the Islamic revolution originates from those who proclaim Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion. The Qur'an indeed contains scripture that proclaims peace and tolerance as evidenced in the following verses:

- "Mankind! We created you from a male and female, and made you into peoples and tribes so that you might come to know each other. The noblest among you in God's sight is that one of you who best performs his duty. God is All-Knowing, All-Aware." (Qur'an, 49:13)
- "You who believe! Show integrity for the sake of God, bearing witness with justice. Do not let hatred for a people incite you into not being just. Be just. That is closer to faith. Heed God [alone]. God is aware of what you do." (Qur'an, 5:8)
- "Those who believe, those who are Jews, and the Christians and Sabaeans, all who believe in God and the Last Day and act rightly, will have their reward with their Lord. They will feel no fear and will know no sorrow." (Qur'an, 2:62)

It is important to recognize, however, that the preponderance these "peace and tolerance-type passages" are intended for the Muslims, not Kafirs (persons who do not recognize Allah or the Prophet Muhammad). Furthermore, the few passages that are targeted for non-Muslims often include a clause that requires one's complete submission to Allah, in addition to taxation and/or a reduction in class status that is beneath Muslims. One should also recognize that the aforementioned peaceful verses represent a diminutive piece of the Qur'an. The preponderance of the Qur'an professes violence and a call to arms in the name of Allah.

- "Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) Hath Allah promised good: But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward" (Sura, 4:95)

- "O ye who believe! what is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling heavily to the earth? Do ye prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place." (Sura 9:38-39)

- "Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil: so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan." (Qur'an 4:76)

Bin Laden and his revolutionaries use these passages and many others to help fuel their struggle, or jihad, against the infidels with the preponderance of their intellectual and military capacity invested against the U.S. The threat is real, significant, nested within the Qur'an, and spreading throughout the ungoverned or under governed regions of the world where chaos and lawlessness flourish. Al-Qaeda is at war against America and its interests, and it will not rest or capitulate until the U.S. withdraws from its holy land and Islam achieves its preeminence on the world stage. The just cause criterion for waging war against this peril was indeed realized as on the battlefields of Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and its supporting Taliban regime. It is here that the U.S. finds itself in a war of ideas and the clash of two visions of the world. The late Yusuf Al-Ayyiri, one of Bin Laden's closest associates since the early 90's and a prolific al-Qaeda propagandist, echoed this sentiment and offered that the side prepared to accept more sacrifices will win.⁷

⁷ Michael Scott Duran , "The Saudi Paradox," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 83, Number 1, (January/February 2004): 4.

Afghanistan: A Just War that Must be Won

The war in Afghanistan is indeed justified as argued in the previous chapter's JWT analysis. Though there are Just War theorists that maintain the primacy of pacifism vice warfare as a means to a political end, legal authorities that draw attention to inadequate international laws that govern terrorism and other 21st century non-state actor security dilemmas, and scholars that debate the intangible and difficult to measure moral factors that are intrinsically embedded in JWT, the U.S. finds itself on solid moral high ground in its first war against global terrorism. Legitimate authority, public declaration, last resort, reasonable chance of success, just intent, and just cause are internationally and domestically accepted criteria that govern a nation's decision to declare and wage war. With respect to Afghanistan, these criteria have been satisfied in the eyes of the Bush Administration and the international community writ large. This satisfaction is critical in gaining and sustaining international and domestic support for U.S. war efforts in addition to the advancement of its National Security Strategy and its pillars of promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity and leading a continuing community of democracies.

After JWT analysis and validation, this study further examines the Taliban and al-Qaeda threat, its linkages, and the true nature and goals of the Islamic revolutionary movement. The enemy seriously threatens the vital national interests of the U.S. and its friends and allies. This is clearly evidenced by Bin Laden's 1998 fatwa and the totality of the Islamic revolutionary movement's ultimate objective of a caliphate followed by the establishment of Islam as the world's religion in which all nations and all people are placed under the submission of Allah and his laws. The enemy's uncompromising ideology is strong, founded in the jihadist underpinnings of the Qur'an, and presents a

clash of civilizations in which there can be only one victor. The Islamic revolutionary movement arguably presents the greatest threat to the U.S. and its allies than in any time in the modern history of warfare. Hitler's insatiable appetite for European and world domination, coupled with the strong ideological support of the Nazi party and supporting military infrastructure, perhaps best represents the scale and scope of today's enemy. Sir Winston Churchill fully acknowledged the Nazi threat and knew that war and ultimate victory were paramount to the survival of the British Empire and all of mankind. In his first speech as Prime Minister, Churchill provided the House of Commons his thoughts of Great Britain's aim in World War II.

“You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. Let that be realised; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal.”¹

Just War + Threat = The Need for the U.S. to Concentrate its Elements of National Power

Reminiscent of Churchill's perspective, President Bush understood the grave threat posed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda operating within Afghanistan. On September 20, 2001 he addressed Congress and the American people assuring them that the U.S. would “direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror

¹ The Churchill Centre. “Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat Speech.”, First Speech as Prime Minister to the House of Commons, May 13, 1940,
<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=391>

network.”² By mid-March 2002, U.S., coalition, and Afghanistan Northern Alliance forces destroyed all known terrorist training camps, removed the Taliban Regime from power, and captured or killed several Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. They exploited information obtained from detainees and secured training camps, and significantly reduced the adversary’s command and control structure and freedom of action in a country that served as its sanctuary a mere six months prior. The U.S. had indeed achieved its first tactical and operational successes in the GWOT. Consequentially, these rapid successes, conducted by a relatively small U.S. footprint, were embraced by Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration, and perceived as the future blueprint for rapid, agile, decisive, and economy of force efforts in the prosecution of future campaigns in the war on terrorism. Afghanistan indeed appeared to be a “a swift victory on the cheap” as compared to historical U.S. war efforts, and the Bush Administration quickly turned its attention on Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Regrettably, the U.S. failed to concentrate its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power in Afghanistan to exploit its tactical and operational successes, thereby creating a power vacuum and opportunity for Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives to reorganize and propagate a determined and unrelenting insurgency that continues today.

It is, however, important to acknowledge that the U.S., its coalition partners, and the Government of Afghanistan have realized numerous accomplishments in the course of six years, and that Afghanistan enjoys the prospect of a future that is void of an

² U.S. President. The White House, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” The White House Press Release (September 20, 2001).

oppressive Taliban rule. In 2004, Afghanistan enjoyed its first democratic presidential election and, a year later, ratified its constitution and conducted parliamentary elections. That same year, more than 9,000 Afghanis...

“received medical treatment from coalition medical personnel, including many civilians who received medical evacuation to military medical facilities for treatment...and coalition veterinary personnel treated and immunized more than 13,200 animals and livestock. [Furthermore over] 700 schools educating more than 4.5 million Afghan children were built, rebuilt, repaired, or refurbished.”³

USAID reports that as of March 2007, it has repaired 715 km of critical, multi-donor “Ring Road” that connects the capitol of Kabul with Kandahar and Herat, in addition to over 1,772 km of secondary, national, and provincial road networks that are critical in transporting goods to market.⁴ Furthermore, USAID “constructed or refurbished over 640 medical clinics throughout the country, established over 3,000 health posts, and [continues to support] the operations of 360 health facilities, including the provision of all medicines...”⁵ With respect to international support, NATO’s International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) remains intact and continues to employ the efforts of 26 NATO and 11 non-NATO nations.

While the aforementioned accomplishments are truly noteworthy, the fact remains that after six years of what many describe as the forgotten war, the Taliban and al-Qaeda Associated Movement (AQAM) insurgency continues to draw its ideological and training base from its known sanctuary in Pakistan. Furthermore, as of November 2007, 54% of

³ John D. Banusiewicz , “Election Tops Year’s Accomplishments in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, December 29, 2004

⁴ USAID. “From the American People, Afghanistan.” USAID.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan (accessed 03 February 2008).

⁵ Ibid.

Afghanistan's landmass hosts a permanent Taliban presence⁶ and attacks on U.S. and allied forces increased from 1,558 in 2005 to 4,542 in 2006⁷. As recent as January 15, 2007 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned NATO's Secretary General that the insurgent threat is expected to increase in 2007. After six years of war, Afghan Security Forces are "miserably resourced,"⁸ undermanned, and unable to conduct decisive operations in light of historically low and current U.S. and ISAF troop levels and capabilities and their corresponding inability to wage an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign while providing security to the people of Afghanistan. After six years of war, Afghanistan ranks 173 out of 178 countries in the basic index of human development, effectively putting it in a tie for last place with a few African countries⁹ and its economy is dominated by illicit opium production which accounts for \$2.3 billion – more than half as much as impoverished Afghanistan's legitimate gross domestic product.¹⁰ After six years of war, victory indeed remains illusive, and the U.S. has yet to employ what the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review refers to as "unified statecraft: the

⁶ The SENLIS Council, Security and Development Policy Group, *Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink*, Brussels, Kabul, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rio, November 2007.

⁷ Iona Meagher, "The War List: OEF/OIF Statistics," *PTSD Combat, Winning the War Within*.

⁸ Barry R. McCaffrey, GEN, USA (Ret), "Academic Report- Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan Friday, 19 May through Friday, 26 May," Adjunct Professor of International Affairs United States Military Academy West Point, NY (June 3, 2006).

⁹ Along with Somalia, Afghanistan is one of two countries in the world unable to produce accurate enough data to be ranked in UN Development Programme's annual Human Development Report. Using available data, however, Afghanistan's National Human Development Report 2004 estimated that Afghanistan would have ranked 173 out of 178, barely ahead of the African states of Chad, Mali, Burkina, Faso, Sierra Leone, and Niger. UNDP, *Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004*, http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/AFG_Afghanistan/afghanistan_2004_en.pdf.

¹⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, "How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America's War on Terror," CATO Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing, No 84, November 10, 2004:5.

ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all of the elements of national power...in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.”¹¹

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (June 2006, Final Draft), illustrates the extremely complex nature of insurgency and COIN warfare and states that although no two insurgencies are alike, at its fundamental core is “the struggle for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the center of gravity for friendly forces.”¹² The insurgent fully understand the primacy of controlling the population as well, and if he manages to “disassociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”¹³ In this mutual struggle to win the “human terrain” the U.S.’ possesses the requisite elements of national power to assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing the social, economic, and basic human needs of its people. Without question, this intrinsic governmental responsibility rests squarely with President Karzai and his Administration. However, in light of the domestic challenges its fragile and youthful republic faces, the U.S. must concentrate its DIME elements to support the Afghan government’s quintessential fight for the hearts and minds of its population and establish security conditions favorable to the protection and advancement of America’s vital national interests.

¹¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review. “The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006: 83.

¹² FM 2-34, “Counterinsurgency”, Final Draft, June 2006: 1-24.

¹³ David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964: 7-8.

The remainder of this paper examines DIME efforts that require considerable U.S. emphasis and action to wage a successful COIN campaign and achieve its political end state in Afghanistan. Diplomatic efforts must address Pakistan and the sanctuary it provides to Taliban and AQAM forces and the maintenance and advancement of ISAF capabilities in light of several countries' national caveats and expeditionary war fighting readiness. Informational efforts must focus on U.S. strategic communication efforts to counter Islamic revolutionary ideology while maintaining the will of the American people and the coalition during what has already become a protracted and often forgotten war. The military element of national power requires a significant increase of forces, in concert with ISAF, to secure Afghanistan's population until Afghan Security Forces can assume full responsibility via a robust Foreign Internal Defense program. Finally, the U.S. must adequately address Afghanistan's illicit opium-based economy. In the absence of a lawful and prosperous financial system, the Afghan government will be unable to provide for its people and will not attain credibility on the world stage.

Sanctuary – A Critical Insurgent Capability Throughout the Ages

Recognized insurgency expert Bernard Fall defined sanctuary “as a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which, though ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and – if it can get away with it – troops.”¹ As demonstrated throughout the history of insurgent warfare, Fall argues that a key aspect of any successful insurgency is the ability to leverage the advantages that safe-havens provide to combatant forces. While the counterinsurgent’s denial or interdiction of sanctuaries do not, in and of themselves, decide the outcome of the conflict, they nonetheless present a source of uncontested insurgent strength and power if ignored due to political considerations or targeted with insufficient resources.

In the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), communist rebels benefited from the use of sanctuaries in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Anti-French rebels in Indochina (1946-1954) relied on China for logistical support and safe refuge, and anti-French fighters in the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) depended on Morocco and Tunisia for safe havens. The U.S. faced a significant sanctuary dilemma during its Vietnam experience as the North Vietnamese Army extensively relied on the hospitality of Cambodia and Laos for supplies and a permissive environment in which to organize and plan attacks into South Vietnam. In most recent, pre-9/11 history, the Soviet Union struggled to address the Mujahidin’s freedom of movement into and out of the only viable U.S. supported sanctuary during its Soviet-Afghanistan War – Pakistan. In each of

¹ Bernard B. Fall. *Street Without Joy*. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1967, 375.

the aforementioned cases, COIN forces were precluded from invading these sanctuaries in light of existing political and military circumstances, but alternative options were nonetheless employed.

Greece and France

Though the Greeks never managed to control their outermost frontiers during its civil war, Yugoslavia's communist leader, Josef Tito did take prudent measures to seal his borders in fear of inconsistent Yugoslavian communist views proliferating throughout his countryside. Persistent Greek COIN operations, coupled with U.S. aide and Tito's efforts to deny sanctuary, eventually contributed to the demise of Greece's insurgency. With respect to France's insurgency experience in Indochina, its forces were unable to seal the border with China as they were all but consumed with the insurgent fight within Indochina's territorial borders. Consequentially, France lost its former colony in 1954. Learning from its operational failure to prevent sanctuary in China, the French, during the Algerian War of Independence, built an extensive barrier system to isolate Algerian insurgents and aid in the prevention of sanctuaries via the Sahara desert. The barrier was called the Morice line that extended along 200 miles of the Tunisian frontier. Anchored by the Mediterranean Sea in the north and the Sahara Desert in the south, it was a miracle of modern technology. The barrier consisted of an eight foot high electric fence through which a charge of 5000 volts was passed and sensors. There was a 45-meter minefield on either side of it, sensors to detect attempted breaches, and extensive barbed wire entanglement. In the event that insurgents attempted to penetrate the barrier, an alarm was automatically activated that triggered instant fire from 105 mm howitzers and the rapid employment of French forces specifically assigned to patrol the line. The French

dedicated 80,000 soldiers to this mission set.² The Morice Line, though expensive in terms of materiel and force structure, proved effective and, according to one estimate, reduced insurgent infiltration by 90%. Unfortunately, France did not capitalize on this success and withdrew from the conflict due to politics on the home front.³

Vietnam

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. appreciated the serious implications that Cambodia and Laos presented as a logistic lifeline for the North Vietnamese Army. The Kennedy Administration sought military solutions to address this problem “that would fit inside the diplomatic framework of nominal Laotian and Cambodian neutrality, however one-sided that neutrality may be.”⁴ Furthermore, the Administration had to delicately balance military solutions with dissuading China and Russia from entering into the war. President Kennedy quickly turned to Army Special Forces and CIA operatives as a logical force of choice to address the sanctuary dilemma because of their operational expertise with indigenous forces and their advisory role to local government officials and militaries in the region.⁵ Early war efforts involved limited CIA and Special Forces attempts, in concert with small pockets of CIA-trained Laotian natives, to reconnoiter enemy supply lines within Laos. These efforts expanded in 1964 as U.S. advisors

² Alistar Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*. New York: Viking Press, 1978), 263-264.

³ Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence,” *Washington Quarterly*, 29 (Winter 2005-06), 32; John R. Hamilton, “Defeating Insurgency on the Border,” (Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1985), Online: <http://www.globalsecurity.org>; and Joseph Jeremiah Zasloff, *The Role of Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China’s Support to the Vietminh, 1946-1954* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1967).

⁴ Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr., “Out of Bounds, Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare, Global War on Terrorism, Occasional Paper 17, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22.

⁵ For details see Kenneth Conboy, *Shadow War: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995), 1-114; Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 16-43; Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 87-94; and Shultz, *Secret War*, 13-15.

worked with South Vietnamese Special Forces in the prosecution of Operation Lena. During the operation, Montagnard tribesmen, who had been trained by the U.S., were led into Laos by South Vietnamese Special Forces to perform deeper and more detailed reconnaissance operations. Regrettably, the operation ended badly as the majority of the five South Vietnamese-led teams that parachuted into Laos were quickly captured or killed. Those who managed to survive gathered little useable information.⁶

This tactical failure convinced the Kennedy Administration that America would have to play a direct role in future infiltrations into Laos, regardless of possible diplomatic ramifications of violating Laotian neutrality. This direct approach would first manifest itself in the creation of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) within the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV). Its charter included Special Operations reconnaissance operations into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam with a focus on the Ho Chi Min Trail.⁷ Laos infiltrations began in earnest in 1965 followed by Cambodia in 1967. Cognizant of the political sensitivities surrounding unilateral U.S. operations in these countries, SOG personally led South Vietnamese teams into the bordering countries and did so wearing nondescript uniforms and carrying untraceable weapons. In 1996, MACV SOG employed over 100 teams into Laos and two years later, some 800 teams were employed into Laos and Cambodia combined.⁸ The teams engaged in small scale offensive operations to include limited raids on supply depots, ambushes and rescue operations, but their weighted effort came in the form of targeting for U.S. air strikes. In

⁶ William Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 8-10; and John L. Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 27-28.

⁷ SOG also took over the CIA's role in such operations. Plaster, *SOG*, 22-28; Shultz, *Secret War*, 31-49.

⁸ Shultz, *Secret War*, 65-68; Plaster, *SOG*, 34; Rosenau, *Special Operations*, 17-19; Clarke, *Final Years*, 195-207; and Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, "Secrecy and Stealth: Cross-Border Reconnaissance in Indochina," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 25 (July-September 1999), 47-52.

Laos for example, American pilots flew over 100,000 bombing missions and dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of ordnance on the trail in the years 1965-1967. In the final analysis, these air strikes did indeed disrupt Ho Chi Min Trail activities but in no way denied the enemy sanctuary or the flow of supplies into South Vietnam. The scale of the problem far outweighed U.S. efforts in the form of resources, in particular manning and budget. Making matters worse, the communists stepped up its defenses against U.S. led reconnaissance missions and inflicted heavy friendly casualties. By 1970, it was doubtful that the losses could be justified by the intelligence gained.⁹

Aware that reconnaissance missions, coupled with air strikes, were proving ineffective in defeating the Laos and Cambodia sanctuary dilemma, the U.S. decided to take a chapter out of France's success with its Morice Line during the war in Algeria. In 1966-1967 Secretary of Defense McNamara embraced the idea of installing an electronic barrier, comprised of sensors and mines, along key infiltration routes along the demilitarized zone and into Laos. General Westmoreland transposed the demilitarized zone into a traditional series of defensive positions manned by South Vietnamese Army troops and U.S. Marines. His plan was to clear an area approximately one half mile wide which contained sensors, minefields, watchtowers, and barbed wire. This line was to be covered with fortified defensive fighting positions supported by interlocking artillery fires. With respect to extending the electronic sensor barrier – or McNamara Line – into Laos and eventually Cambodia, numerous sensors and associate munitions were air dropped or carried in by Special Forces teams. Like the tactical successes enjoyed by MACV SOG, the McNamara Line did degrade the use of enemy sanctuary and supply

⁹ Henry G. Gole, "Shadow Wars and Secret Wars: Phoenix and MACVSOG," *Parameters*, 21 (Winter 1991-92), 104-105.

lines. In Laos, for example, use of sensors and AC-130 gunships inflicted enormous damage upon the communist logistic system, including the destruction of tens of thousands of trucks.¹⁰ Regardless of the limited tactical successes associated with the McNamara Line, it did not turn the tide of the war. First, the Ho Chi Min Trail was too extensive and covered by thick triple canopy vegetation, making sensor/air interdiction difficult. Second, the communists adapted their tactics, techniques and procedures to avoid or neutralize many of the sensors. Unlike the French defending the Morice Line, the U.S. did not employ 80,000 soldiers to defend or monitor these sensors. Third, by 1968 the communists did not have to rely on the supplies via the Ho Chi Min Trail. Last, they had developed a sophisticated supply system with South Vietnam that could sustain its insurgency operation regardless of the pressure placed on sanctuaries in neighboring countries.

The U.S.' final attempt to deny enemy sanctuary came in 1970 when President Nixon approved American conventional forces to cross into Cambodia in light of the North Vietnamese's thirst to expand its dominance into Cambodia's unstable political institution. American and ARVN units began offensive attacks in late April 1970. Though allied forces were only authorized to penetrate a depth of roughly 20 miles into Cambodia, they realized tremendous tactical and operational successes. Estimates include the killing of at least 10,000 North Vietnamese Army soldiers, the capture or destruction of tens of thousands of weapons, 1,800 tons of ammunition, over 8,000 tons

¹⁰ Bernard C. Nalty, *The War Against the Trucks: Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2005), passim; Herman J. Gilster, *The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 13-73; Momyer, *Airpower*, 237-276; Ballard, *Development of Fixed Wing Gunships*, 77-248; Tilford, *Crosswinds*, 108-118, 124-127; Shaw, *Cambodia Campaign*, 13-14.

of rice, and over a million pages of enemy documents. The attacks hurt communist morale, cut off the Sinahouk Trail, and set back NVA efforts on the border for months. Notwithstanding they did not deny the NVA sanctuary altogether in Cambodia, nor did the attacks deal with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and sanctuaries in Laos.¹¹ These security dilemmas would ultimately rest with the South Vietnamese, as the U.S. began its troop withdrawal in earnest in 1971 – dilemmas which the South Vietnamese would never find a solution.

Soviet-Afghan War

Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. was once again presented with the criticality of sanctuaries during the Soviet-Afghan War. Perhaps ironically, the U.S. no longer faced the sanctuary dilemma as COIN force, but rather found itself in a position to support Mujahidin sanctuary in Afghanistan's bordering country of Pakistan. To step back for a moment, the Soviet Union had geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as it served as a pathway toward the oil rich Middle East and the long-coveted warm water port on the Indian Ocean. This interest, coupled with a chaotic and unstable Afghanistan political landscape, the U.S.' withdrawal from Vietnam, and its conciliatory policy of détente toward the Soviet Union, set the strategic stage for a Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in December 1979.¹² In the next several months, approximately 85,000 Soviet troops were employed and by 1982 this number would grow to a steady state of 115,000 for the remainder of the war. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviet's began to create a wedge between their imposed form of government and the population to include

¹¹ Sorley, *Better War*, 200-214; Shaw, *Cambodian Campaign*, 153-170; Tho, *Cambodian Incursion*, 171-175; Clarke, *Final Years*, 418-425.

¹² Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr, "Out of Bounds Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare," *Combat Studies Institute Press, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper*, 17, 51.

the enforcement of radical reforms that challenged local traditions.¹³ These reforms, exacerbated by a Soviet military based kinetic approach to COIN, led to the creation and rise of Afghanistan's freedom fighters – the Mujahidin. Though the Mujahidin were plagued with internal politics of their own to include tribal and spiritual differences, it shared a common enemy in the Soviet Union. The Mujahidin struggled to coordinate military operations in what today may be described as operational design, but it did share two additional vital commonalities: the support of the wider world who vehemently opposed the Soviet invasion, and access to safe sanctuary and relatively easy supply across an international border with Pakistan.¹⁴

President Carter acted decisively following the invasion and during his January 30, 1980 State of Union Address declared that, "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹⁵ The U.S. now stood firmly in a position to support the Mujahidin and their efforts to thwart Soviet aggression. This support would manifest itself in financial aid, anti-Soviet propaganda, arms shipments to include Stinger missiles, medical supplies, and CIA support. The problem for the U.S. became how to get these critical supplies and capabilities into a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Constrained by the Soviet republics that bordered Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Pakistan were the only

¹³ On the early stages of direct Soviet control and for biographical sketches of many of the major players, see Amstutz, *Afghanistan*, 51-86.

¹⁴ On international law aspects of the invasion see W. Michael Reisman and James Silk, "Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?" *American Journal of International Law*, 82 (July 1988), 459-486. See also Amstutz, *Afghanistan*, 199-222.

¹⁵ President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 23 January 1980, as cited by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "US Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy," 27 March 1980, Department of State, Current Policy No. 153, as reprinted in *Case Study: National Security Policy under Carter*, Department of National Security Affairs, Air War College, AY 1980-81, 98.

border countries that offered a potential answer to the aforementioned question. Though Iran openly supported the insurgency and provided limited aid, the Mujahidin avoided the large open areas that dominated the Afghan-Iran border. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion into Iran made it extremely difficult for Iran to support the Mujahidin with any consistency or concentrated strength. Last, diplomatic tensions existed between Iran and the U.S. stemming from the ayatollahs' open hostility toward the U.S. on the world stage and their fear of Soviet expansion into Iran if they supported U.S.' efforts in Afghanistan. With respect to China, it too openly denounced the Soviet invasion and demanded its immediate withdrawal. Though it only shared a remote and rugged border with northeastern Afghanistan, called the Wakhan Corridor, it was nonetheless sympathetic to Afghanistan's cause and provided aid to the Mujahadin in the form of small arms, rocket launchers, and heavy artillery.¹⁶ This aid, however, would not come through the mountainous and canalizing terrain that dominated the Wakham Corridor and heavily defended by Soviet forces, but rather through Afghanistan's only practical bordering sanctuary – Pakistan. Politically this placed Pakistan in a precarious diplomatic position, as the Soviet Union threatened to invade its borders if it became involved in the war. Notwithstanding, Pakistan did become an active supporter of the war even in light of strong Soviet rhetoric and Pakistan's insatiable disputes with India. In fact, it not only served as a sanctuary for millions of Afghan refugees who fled the

¹⁶ Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet is Assailed on Afghan Policy," *New York Times*, 28 December 1982, A7; "Peking Hails Cause of Rebels in Cambodia and Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 14 December 1982, A3; Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 123; Yaacov Vertzberger, "Afghanistan in China's Policy," *Problems of Communism*, 31 (May-June 1982), 1-23; "The Wakhan Corridor: An Unlikely Afghan-China Link," CIA Research Paper, May 1980, National Security Archive, Microfiche 0933; Leslie Holmes, "Afghanistan and Sino-Soviet Relations," in *The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan*, edited by Amin Saikal and William Maley, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 122-141.

war, but its mountainous terrain provided the principle safe haven for Mujahidin fighters and the funnel to the resistance for the outside world.¹⁷

The Soviets quickly realized the scope and importance that Pakistan's porous border and protected sanctuaries provided its adversary, and employed numerous countermeasures with varying degrees of success. First and foremost, they continued to coerce Pakistan to close its borders with Afghanistan and cease assistance or suffer a Soviet invasion. In an effort to back this coercion, the Soviets launched multiple air raids and cross border attacks into Mujahidin bases and refugee camps. Consequentially, the attacks killed hundreds of Afghans and Pakistanis over time, but served to ignite international support and strengthen Pakistan's political standing. In an effort to somewhat appease the Soviet Union, the Pakistani government would publically disavow their support to the Mujahidin. All the while, however, it would continue to tangibly support the freedom fighters for the remainder of the war.

Another Soviet attempt at addressing the sanctuary dilemma, came in the form of raising local militia units to protect the border regions and bribing impoverished villagers to take up arms and attack cross border refugee camps and Pakistani towns. Again, the Soviets enjoyed limited tactical success vis-à-vis these tactics, but Pakistan support

¹⁷ On the difficult diplomatic situation for Pakistan and the other supporters of the Mujahideen, see W. Howard Wiggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Pacific Affairs*, 57 (Summer 1984), 284-303; Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf," *MERIP Middle East Report*, (September-October 1987), 35-39; Edgar O'Ballance, "Pakistan: On the Front Porch of Conflict," *Military Review*, 66 (March 1986), 68-75; Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship," *Asian Survey*, 31 (June 1991), 496-511; Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia After Afghanistan," *Problems of Communism*, 34 (January-February 1985), 18-31; Rais, "Afghanistan and the Regional Powers," 906-912.

remained firm and the Soviet-sponsored local militias and villagers did not have the capacity to inflict significant damage to turn the tide of the war. As a final effort to address Mujahidin sanctuary, the Soviets contemplated the construction of a barrier system similar to the Morice and McNamara Lines. Unfortunately for the communists, such designs required at least 300,000 Russian troops along the border, far more than the Soviets were willing to commit.¹⁸ As a compromise, the Soviets employed thousands of mines along the Afghan-Pakistan border with focus along known supply routes and mountain passes. Furthermore, as the war progressed, they shifted the military weight of their efforts into Afghanistan's western frontier regions and effectively degraded Mujahidin operations. By 1987, sustained Soviet air and ground attacks took a toll on the insurgents and significantly degraded the once isolated Pakistan sanctuaries. The war had reached a turning point, and the Soviets were enjoying the offensive momentum they worked so hard to achieve. The Reagan Administration fully acknowledged this change of course and promptly increased financial aid, intelligence support, and arms deliveries – to include Stinger missiles – through Pakistan and into the hands of the Mujahidin. This additive support allowed the freedom fighters to defend the Afghan-Pakistan border areas with sophisticated heavy weapons and air defense weaponry and regain the primacy of Pakistan sanctuary – a sanctuary that would remain steadfast till the Soviet Union's eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.

¹⁸ Kuzichkin, *Inside the KGB*, 349.

The abovementioned case studies illustrate the critical capability that sanctuaries provide insurgent forces and provide some insights into historical COIN measures that were employed to combat them. Though the denial or security of sanctuaries, in isolation, has not served decided victory or defeat, they unequivocally offer a source of significant strength for insurgent forces and a significant vulnerability to COIN forces if not properly addressed. The U.S. faces this quandary today, in a sanctuary it helped support over 18 years ago – Pakistan.

Dealing with Pakistan: A Call for Diplomacy with a “Little m”

In today's war in Afghanistan, Taliban and AQAM forces continue to capitalize on the sanctuary they enjoy in Pakistan. This sanctuary provides a safe haven for the proliferation of Islamic Revolutionary Movement ideology, a military training base for insurgent fighters, and a place for Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership to plan global and regional operations. If one concurs with the assertion that Islamic Revolutionary Movement ideology is the center of gravity for global terrorism, Pakistan sanctuary must unequivocally be considered as a critical capability for this center of gravity to function. In addition to the threat it poses to the immediate Afghanistan and Pakistan landscape, the Director of Central Intelligence stated in the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that al-Qaeda “is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland...[and] we assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)...¹. Though President Bush has publically lauded President Musharraf's efforts as staunch ally in the war on terror, today's reality is that Pakistan sanctuary has not been adequately addressed and remains as significant, if not more so, than at any time during the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom. The long-term solution requires concerted U.S. diplomatic efforts with the potential employment of military force that is politically acceptable to the Musharraf Administration.

The Strategic Setting

Today, Pakistan finds itself absorbed in a cold war with its conventional adversary, India while Islamic revolutionaries seek refuge and wage insurgency within its

¹ National Intelligence Estimate, “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,” July 2007, 6.

borders. In the eyes of Pakistanis, however, India presents the greatest threat to its country's vital national interests. This perception stems (first and foremost) from an intense 60-year dispute over the territorial possession of Kashmir that rests between Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan – a dispute that initiated two wars between the two countries and the Kargil Conflict of 1999 that went so far as to present nuclear escalation potential.² Today, Pakistan's military remains focused on securing the India-Pakistan border and seven of its nine-corps Army, remain dedicated its defense. Pakistan diplomatic efforts have sought United Nation support to resolve the Kashmir dispute via the April 21, 1948 U.N. Resolution which "Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether...Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan."³ India, however, has resisted U.N. involvement and has officially refused to take part in any international security mediations, as it believes that Kashmir is a bi-lateral issue.

U.S. Role

While Pakistan's national security focus rests clearly with India, the Bush Administration's diplomatic efforts with Pakistan have focused on defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the FATA. Though this is clearly in the vital national interest of the U.S., and certainly assists in denying sanctuary to its enemy, it is not perceived by the Musharraf Administration as a clear and present threat to his country's vital national interests. U.S. diplomatic efforts must serve to ease India-Pakistan relations while

² Rajat Ganguly, "India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute," "The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, Asian Studies Institute, Asian Studies Institute & Centre for Strategic Studies.

³ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 (1948)," *The India-Pakistan Question* (21 April).

continuing to pursue feasible military efforts, in the near term, to deny FATA sanctuary. U.S. diplomats must adopt a long-term perspective on Pakistan, “recognizing that peace with India and the reduction of terrorist threats emanating from Pakistani territory are more likely under a maturing democracy than under military rulers with a long history of using extremist groups for their own ends.”⁴ Second, the U.S. should encourage the U.N. and other international organizations, to include the European Union, to persuade Indian and Pakistani governments to allow democratic participation and associated economic growth in their respective parts of Kashmir. The quality of life issues of its people should ultimately take primacy over Kashmir security options. Third, and in light of differing India-Pakistan views with U.N. Resolution 47, the U.S. should consider taking the lead in the creation of a tri-partite commission. This commission would serve to mediate and establish a dialogue with Pakistan and India and communicate shared interests of all three countries to include combating terrorism and democratic reforms. Fourth, the U.S. must continue to press the Pakistan government to take prudent action against the Islamic Revolutionaries and “jihadi madrasas within its borders, while at the same time offering assistance to improve secular education.”⁵ A combination of kinetic and non-kinetic operations will serve to address the immediate enemy threat while shaping Pakistan’s future via its youth and secular education opportunities. Last, the U.S. should compel the Musharaff Administration to allow small-scale unilateral or combined military operations within Pakistan’s FATA.

⁴ International Crisis Group , “STEPS TOWARD PEACE”, ICG Asia Report, No 79, 24 June 2004.

⁵ See ICG Asia Report No36, Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, 29 July 2002 and ICG Asia Report No73, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism, 16 January 2004.

The first four diplomatic initiatives listed above may take years to take seed and flourish. In the short term, the fact remains that Pakistan has not shown a political willingness nor has it employed a military strategy to adequately address enemy sanctuary in the FATA. As a result, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement continues to breed its ideology and militant capacity.

Though the U.S. must address India-Pakistan relations in the long-term, it should offer Musharaff acceptable U.S. unilateral or U.S.-Pakistan combined operations options to address the sanctuary dilemma. Acknowledging the political sensitivities surrounding a U.S. military footprint on Pakistan soil, the potential exists for small-scale clandestine operations designed to train and advise select Pakistan military forces and/or conduct U.S. raids or terminal guidance operations in concert with precision munitions from U.S. or Pakistani Air Forces. These clandestine operations would serve to disrupt enemy sanctuary – with a weighted effort in leadership interdiction – in the FATA while publically concealing U.S. boots on the ground in light of Pakistan’s political landscape. Ideally these operations would complement robust Afghan-Pakistan border security operations. However, Pakistan’s force distribution with respect to India, coupled with the lack of U.S., coalition, and Afghan security forces make effective border security problematic. Even if one were to construct a “Morice Line” barrier system, there would be inadequate force structure to patrol it. France had more soldiers guarding the Morice Line than there are total coalition and Afghan combat forces within Afghanistan’s borders. Detailed force limitations will be addressed in the “military” portion of recommended DIME initiatives.

Though these diplomatic efforts are challenging and, in some cases, contentious in nature, the U.S. must employ prudent diplomatic and military measures to address enemy sanctuary in Pakistan. As acknowledged in General (Ret) James Jones and Ambassador Thomas Pickering's 2008 Afghanistan Study Group Report, "Despite Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts over the last four years, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have developed a strong-hold in this region [FATA] that bolsters the Taliban's capabilities against coalition forces in Afghanistan and facilitates al-Qaeda planning and execution of global terrorist plots."⁶ Six years into the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan provides a critical capability to the enemy and a critical vulnerability to the United States and its coalition partners. Diplomacy, coupled with limited military options, will better serve to address this quandary, and enable the U.S. to achieve its political end state in Afghanistan.

⁶ General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.) and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, "Revitalizing our Efforts Rethinking our Strategies," Center for the Study of the Presidency, Afghanistan Study Group Report, 30 January 2008:37.

A Second Call for Diplomacy: The Future of ISAF

On August 3, 2003 NATO assumed authority and responsibility for the ISAF mission and associated operations in Kabul, Afghanistan. Three years later, this responsibility expanded to control of Regional Command South, where the preponderance of opium production and Taliban sanctuary reside. These historic events mark the “first test of NATO outside Europe...and the Alliance has staked its credibility on the outcome of the mission... Therefore, NATO's success or possible failure will heavily impact its military and political cohesion.”¹ ISAF includes the participation of 37 nations (26 NATO and 11 non-NATO nations) and is comprised of 41,000 troops, to include U.S. soldiers² Its charter consists of stabilization and reconstruction efforts to include the provision of basic security and support to the Afghan government until it is capable of unilaterally providing for its people.

ISAF has realized numerous successes since its inception to include the employment of forward support bases and Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country, seven Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to augment Afghan National Army training efforts of U.S. lead Embedded Training Teams, and limited offensive military operations designed to defeat insurgents.³ These successes are commendable and an integral part of a comprehensive COIN strategy. Furthermore, ISAF serves as a logical extension of U.S. policy and the pursuit of its combating terrorism and democratization tenets as outlined in its National Security Strategy. The Alliance demonstrates solidarity in defense of a common cause and reduces perceptions of U.S.

¹ Bert Koenders, “Afghanistan and the Future of Alliance,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 174 PC 06 E (Netherlands) General Rapporteur.

² Jones and Pickering., 23.

³ Ibid., 3-4.

hegemony in its War on Terror, hence U.S. diplomatic efforts must strive to ensure ISAF success.

Regardless of the abovementioned accomplishments and value-added the Alliance continues to provide, ISAF is under-resourced and its charter is constrained by several countries' national caveats which are incompatible with waging a COIN campaign in Afghanistan's turbulent security situation. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice echoes this sentiment and announced that some major European allies have failed to send significant numbers of troops to the front lines of Southern Afghanistan, leaving the U.S., Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands to bear the brunt of Taliban violence in the region.⁴ The U.S. contributes a third of NATO's ISAF mission in addition to the 12,000 -13,000 forces assigned to the Operation Enduring Freedom mission, and plans to send 3,200 Marines in the Spring of 2008. Britain has employed 7,700 soldiers – an increase of over 4,000 since 2006, Canada 2,300, and the Netherlands 2,100. The remaining ISAF nations contribute the remainder of forces, and although countries such as Germany and Italy are providing 2,500 and 1,800 troops, respectively, national caveats preclude those, and others, from conducting direct combat operations or support operations in non-permissive environments.

National caveats are inextricably linked to national interests and domestic politics, and the U.S. must publically respect these realities in an effort to maintain future Alliance participation –participation which is now in question on the Canadian and German home fronts. Notwithstanding, the U.S. must continue to apply diplomatic pressure on the Alliance to increase troop levels totaling six additional battalions to meet mission

⁴ Anne Gearan, "Rice: NATO-led Afghan Mission 'Bumpy'," AP Diplomatic Writer, Wednesday, Feb 6, 6:28 a.m. ET.

requirements in Southern Afghanistan, its training role with the Afghan Army and Police, and other NATO initiatives.⁵ In addition to NATO troop level and national caveat issues, the U.S. must increase diplomatic efforts, within NATO, to increase military expenditures of participating nations. 20 of the 26 NATO members spend less than the suggested 2% of Gross Domestic product for national defense.⁶ Increased troop levels must be linked to well-trained and equipped forces that can meet Afghanistan's complex COIN challenges while ensuring interoperability with ISAF partners.

⁵ Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, "Winning in Afghanistan: Challenges and Response," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2007.

⁶ Lionel Beechner, "NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership," Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, July 27, 2006 at www.cfr.org/publication/11159/nato_looks_to_expand_mission_and_membership.html (accessed 30 January 2008).

dIIme: The Need to Win the Strategic Communication Fight in the Forgotten War

Joint Publication 5-0 defines strategic communication (SC) as:

“Focused U.S. Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”¹ Simply put, SC is the business of influencing one’s ideas and behaviors in ways which are conducive to the protection or advancement of U.S. national interests. In terms of the war in Afghanistan, the U.S., coalition, Afghan Government, and its enemy find itself in an epic struggle to win a “war of ideas” over Afghanistan’s future – a legitimate, representative government which preserves the fundamental human rights of its people versus the restoration of a Taliban regime which is hospitable to al-Qaeda ideology and operations and the resurgence of Islam primacy over the individual rights of the people. Ultimately, the center of gravity of this classic COIN fight rests with the side that controls the ideas and behaviors of the population, both foreign and domestic. Six years into the war, a victor has yet to reveal itself, and many believe that the U.S. is, in fact, losing the strategic war of ideas in which a man [Bin Laden] in a cave is out-communicating the world’s leading communication society.² While the U.S. has improved its SC policy capacity and capability in the last four years via the consistent leadership in the State Department’s Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, new leadership in the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the creation of a SC

¹ Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, GL-22.

² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States., 377.

roadmap and Department of Defense SC Integration Group³, the nation continues to struggle with its GWOT message to the world and its domestic audience.

The problem originates with the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) which specifically states that:

“The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive.”⁴

The “informational” element of national power is glaringly absent from this capstone policy which is perhaps why al-Qaeda’s strategic message is more effective than the coalition’s among Islamic countries. The NSCT focuses on kinetic and force protection measures required to “win the war,” such as extending defenses and disrupting terrorist operations.⁵ The only non-kinetic means offered is the advancement of effective democracies as the elixir for Islamic revolutionary underpinnings.⁶ Ironically, more than one-third of moderate Muslim Americans believe that its democratic Government is waging a war against Islam.⁷ While most Americans and coalition partners believe in the quality of life experience associated with democracy, one must embrace the fundamental premise that the Muslim community, writ large, considers the war against al-Qaeda as a deeply rooted ideological struggle that is steeped in religion. Democratization, in isolation, offers no direct corollary to a viable solution set. Religious problems typically

³ Defense Science Board, *2008 Strategic Communication Report*, 13.

⁴ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 1.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 8-9.

⁷ Zogby International, *American Muslim Poll 2004: Muslims In The American Public Square: Shifting Political Winds and Fallout from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq*, October 2004. Online at <http://www.projectmaps.com/AMP2004report.pdf> (accessed 10 February 2008) 27.

require religious solutions versus the employment of political or kinetic options.⁸ While the NSCT acknowledges the tension between AQAM's "murderous ideology" and "Western liberal culture," it fails to address the exploitable SC audience – Islam itself and the rift that exists between its more radical [al-Qaeda] and moderate non-violent elements.⁹ Herein lays a critical vulnerability of the AQAM and a moderate Muslim target audience that is certainly more susceptible to behavioral and ideological modifications than a suicide bomber that is willing to sacrifice his life for a greater and noble cause. Strategist Ralph Peters eloquently articulated this construct in 2002.

"Our strategic blunder has been to attempt to work outward from Islam's inner sanctum....We must realign our efforts to work inward from the edges. Our assets and our energies should be spent where change is still possible or already underway, not squandered where opposition to all that we value has hardened implacably."¹⁰

The U.S. SC strategy for combating terrorism should focus on engaging internationally recognized Islamic organizations and spiritual leaders at the national strategic to tactical levels of war to reach out to non-violent Muslims, de-legitimize the Islamic Revolutionary Movement's ideology and its use of terrorism, and deny AQAM the politico-religious high ground it continues to exploit day in and day out.¹¹ As an example, the U.S. should engage the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an

⁸ Angel M. Rabasa and others, *The Muslim World After 9/11* (RAND Corporation, 2004), 62.

⁹ Dr. Joseph Kickasola, *Rationales for Moderation and Militancy in Islamic Politics: How Muslims Justify Their Ideological Landscape*, Briefing to USNORTHCOM on 15 March 2007 and in abbreviated form at the Office of the Chaplain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pentagon) on 29 March 2007.

¹⁰ Ralph Peters, "Rolling Back Radical Islam," *Parameters. U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Autumn 2002, 7-8. Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/peters.htm>. While he advocates focusing on non-Arab Islamic states, this discourse argues that the U.S. should embrace and empower organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and their initiatives to extol moderate Islamic teachings.

¹¹ Angel M. Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement*, (Executive Summary). (RAND Corporation, 2006), xxiv.

inter-governmental organization of 57 States which was established in 1969. Its charter includes promoting solidarity among all Islamic member states; consolidating member state cooperation in cultural, social, economic, and scientific fields; eliminating discrimination and racial segregation and to oppose colonialism; and supporting all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity, independence, and national rights.¹²

Following the 9/11 attacks, the OIC strongly condemned the terror acts on the U.S. stating that they were “opposed to the tolerant divine message of Islam which spurns aggression, calls for peace, coexistence, tolerance and respect among people, highly praises the dignity of human life and prohibits the killing of the innocent.”¹³ The OIC also agreed to participate in an international U.N. effort to define terrorism, address its causes, eradicate its roots, and achieve international security and stability. Furthermore, it identified the necessity to “undertake a joint effort to promote dialogue and create links or contacts between the Islamic world and the West in order to reach mutual understanding and build bridges of confidence between the two civilizations.”¹⁴ These findings provide a powerful SC message that is articulated from Muslim leaders and religious scholars and masterfully catered to the non-violent Muslim population. The lesson learned is that the U.S. does not need to thrust its own ideals upon the Islamic community, but rather persuade them to grasp their own – a lesson which applies from the tactical to the national strategic levels of war.

In addition to targeting the moderate, non-violent Muslim community via internationally recognized Islamic organization and spiritual leaders, the U.S. must not

¹² Organization of the Islamic Conference, *OIC In Brief*, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Online, Accessed 27 May 2007, <http://www.oic-oci.org/>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid

lose sight of its center of gravity in the Afghanistan war – the American people. Protracted foreign wars run counter to the moral fiber of American society, and as Henry Kissinger points out, the U.S. was not originally designed to sustain a complex foreign policy. In fact, the framers of the Constitution assumed that, once independent, the U.S. could operate reasonably well in relative isolation. Kissinger argues that this attitude prevails today and that Americans have little patience “for a long time of foreign tension.”¹⁵ The longer the Afghan War continues, the more strained this patience becomes. Exacerbating matters, the war has been relegated to an economy of force effort in the shadows of Iraq, and many Americans view it as a relative success story in light of the lackluster coverage it garners from U.S. media outlets.¹⁶ Acknowledging the political impetus placed on the Iraq war and the plethora of pre-surge negative media coverage associated with it, the U.S. must engage the American people and keep them apprised of the uncompromising threat within Afghanistan’s borders and its corollary to global security and the DIME initiatives underway to thwart such aggression. World Wars I and II demonstrated that the American people will “stay the course” and invest their national treasure, in terms of capital and bloodshed, to defeat an onerous threat that directly affects U.S. national interests. Regrettably, U.S. SC policy caters principally to foreign audiences as an extension of the Department of State. Specific targeting of the U.S. domestic audience is often difficult to uncover due to negative perceptions associated with Psychological Operations or propaganda in a media-free society. Nevertheless, the DoD released its SC plan for Afghanistan in 2007, stating that the desired end state is

¹⁵ Opinion Journal from the Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, “Diplomacy in the Post 9/11 Era”, Interview with Henry Kissinger, David B. Rivkin, Jr., November 17, 2007, 2.

¹⁶ Jean MacKenzie, country director for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Afghanistan during an Apr 06 interview.

“The Afghan people and people in Allied and partner countries recognize and support the efforts of the Afghan government, the U.S., its Allies and partners in stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan.”¹⁷ Though unfortunate that this SC plan was published nearly six years after the war began, the Department has taken a prudent step in addressing the U.S. center of gravity in Afghanistan – the American people. Proof will come from deliverables that place the Afghan War back in U.S. media and away from the “forgotten war-status” it has inappropriately become.

¹⁷ Department of Defense Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan, 12 Sep 2007, 2.

A Big “M” Requirement with Too Little “m”

In addition to the recommended employment of the diplomatic and informational elements of national power provided in the previous chapters, the U.S. and its coalition partners require considerable more forces to conduct an effective COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Dr. Paul Melshen, a Professor of Strategic Studies and Military History at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School and COIN strategist, argues that COIN “is manpower intensive. All too often counterinsurgents try to wage a counterinsurgency ‘on the cheap’ ...which can prove disastrous.”¹ Though no two insurgencies are exactly alike, and strategic success in one COIN campaign may not prove effective in another, history has proven that COIN insurgency forces must be large enough to take the fight to the insurgents while keeping the population safe from insurgent intimidation or coercion.² C.E. Callwell, a renowned COIN and “small wars” theorist, cautioned against indecisive COIN operations and emphasized that “every undertaking should have a definite and distinct purpose, and once entered upon should be carried out to the end...The enemy must be forced to understand that business is meant, that the regular army intends to accomplish whatever enterprise it engages in. Half measures are fatal.”³ Though this fundamental premise has withstood the test of time, the U.S. inappropriately calculated the insurgent struggle it, the coalition, and the Afghan Government continue to face. Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration surmised that the early stages of the Afghanistan war were masterfully conducted by a small, agile, and

¹ “Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigns, A paper presented at the Philippine Army Senior Leaders Conference, 17 March 2006, Dr. Paul Melshen, Professor of Strategic Studies and Military History, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A., p.8.

² Ibid., 6-7.

³ Charles Edward Callwell. *Small Wars: A Textbook for Imperial Soldiers*. London: Greenhill Books, 1990. Republished edition, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1896, 100-101.

lethal U.S. footprint and that the Administration could focus its military might to remove the Iraqi regime. Consequentially, Afghanistan became an “economy of force” mission as opposed to bringing to bear enough resources to ensure decisive operations and the proper transition of a secure Afghanistan to its government.⁴

The U.S. continues to contribute 12,000-13,000 steady-state forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and plans to send 3,200 Marines to join the fight in the Spring of 2008. ISAF brings additional troop strength to the COIN struggle, but one must recall that the preponderance of NATO forces prosecuting the kinetic war against AQAM forces equates to approximately 10,000 soldiers – bringing the total kinetic-capable coalition force structure to a mere 36,000 troops. In comparison, forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom total 170,000 – in a country whose land mass and total population is 215,338 square kilometers and 4,390,285, respectively, smaller than Afghanistan.⁵ Exacerbating matters, Afghanistan’s population base is more widely dispersed among the rugged, mountainous terrain that dominates its territorial borders. On a positive note, the Afghan National Army continues to increase its capacity and capabilities and as of 2006, it is about 30,000 strong and building to a goal of an additional 40,000.⁶ Notwithstanding, Secretary of Defense Gates articulated in a December 10, 2007 interview that “Even with Afghan security forces, troop levels are one-tenth the number prescribed by U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, which is usually a

⁴ Wes Clark on the Iraq War, “The American people have a right to know, they have a need to know” Countdown with Keith Olbermann, 6/20/07, Filed under: Military Commentator, Afghanistan, Terrorism, Interviews, Media – faithinwes @ 3:25 pm, <http://clarkiw.wordpress.com/tag/afghanistan>.

⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, Afghanistan and Iraq, 10/4/2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed on 28 February 2008).

⁶ Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 21 Sep 06

minimum of 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents, or about 480,000 troops in Afghanistan.”⁷ Historical COIN case studies demonstrate this manpower-intensive paradigm.

During the Algerian War of Independence, the French embraced a critical lesson learned from their Indo-China experience “and rapidly expanded their manpower in Algeria, from 56,000 in November 1954 to 250,000 in April 1956.”⁸ Furthermore France “augmented their regular forces with over 60,000 Algerian auxiliary forces.”⁹ Not including these auxiliary forces, French forces achieved a 1:40 troop to civilian ratio to assist in securing Algeria’s population of 10,000,000. Another supporting historical example can be found in the Greek Cypriots’ revolt against British colonial rule in Cyprus from 1954-1959. Understanding the complex nature surrounding a determined insurgency, coupled with the religious and ethnic underpinnings of a Muslim movement, Britain increased its troop levels from 17,000 in 1956 to 40,000 one year later. In conjunction with the security and law and order services provided by the Cyprus’ 5,878-person police force, Britain achieved a 1:10 troop to civilian ratio.¹⁰

Where the British and French invested heavily in manpower to secure the population, America failed to meet this COIN imperative in Vietnam. As the tactical situation in South Vietnam grew increasing grim as the war progressed, senior advisers warned President Johnson in mid-1966 that U.S. force requirements would entail the

⁷ Center for American Progress, “Six Questions for Secretary Gates”, by Caroline Wadhams, December 10, 2007, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/regions/centralasia/>

⁸ Alf Andrew Heggoy. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972, 79.

⁹ Alister Horne. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*. New York: History Book Club, 1972, 255.

¹⁰ Dr. Paul Melchen, Historical Case Study Powerpoint Presentations provided to COL James E. Kraft, Jr., Student, Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

employment of over half a million men.¹¹ President Johnson, however, refused to increase the requisite manpower and opted for a “cheaper” but less effective COIN practice – increased aerial bombing of North Vietnam.¹² The U.S. Marine Corps, however, did pursue a strategically sound and effective Combined Action Program (CAP) which focused on pacification and population security versus the Army’s mobile warfare approach. The CAP strategy, designed by the commander of Marine forces in Vietnam – General Walt – centered on pacifying enclaves and then to “expand the pacified areas as rapidly as possible, but only as fast as they are secure, tranquil, and effectively policed by Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.”¹³ The Marines realized numerous successes in its pacification strategy, coupled with their proven ability to maneuver quickly from secured enclaves and close with and destroy enemy concentrations.¹⁴ Notwithstanding, General Westmoreland grew impatient with the CAP strategy, as it took considerable time to achieve tangible results – time which could be better spent with ‘more dramatic [read kinetic] successes.’¹⁵ As a result, and in light of the drawdown of forces beginning in 1969, the CAP program was marginalized and never adopted into the U.S. war fighting ethos in Vietnam. In the final analysis, security of South Vietnam’s *people* – arguably the adversary’s center of gravity – was subordinated to the kinetic defeat of insurgent forces. Neither was accomplished.

The U.S. should have exploited the initial successes realized in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and dominated the Afghan landscape. Specifically, this

¹¹ Stanley Karnow. *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1983, 498.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 9, Summer 2000, Number 2, “The US Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam: The Formulation of Counterinsurgency Tactics within a Strategic Debate, 67.

¹⁴ Ibid., 67-68

¹⁵ William C. Westmoreland. *A Soldier Reports*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976, 16-46.

domination would have required appropriate troop to civilian ratios to secure the population, defeat a determined insurgency, and develop Afghan security force capacity and capability to bear this burden – a burden which ultimately and appropriately will rest on their shoulders.

Some military and political analysts take umbrage to this premise and argue that the Afghans would perceive a large U.S. footprint as an occupation force on Muslim soil. While the adversary may attempt to exploit this argument via its information campaign, a large, decisive force presents a greater probability of achieving its COIN objectives in a shorter amount of time than a small force that is under resourced. It is far more palatable to go in heavy and get out early than to go in light and fall prey to an indecisive protracted struggle. Furthermore, a World Public Opinion poll released in January 2006, reported that 83 percent of Afghans polled have a “a favorable view of the US military forces in our country”, and 39 percent of those polled have a very favorable view. Only 17 percent had an unfavorable view.¹⁶ Regrettably, today’s U.S. and international political landscape will make it difficult to surge the requisite forces into Afghanistan in light of ISAF challenges, operations in Iraq, and an upcoming change in U.S. Administration. Notwithstanding, the correct answer is to send significantly more U.S. troops to Afghanistan – a proposition that cannot be accomplished “on the cheap.”

¹⁶ World Public Opinion.Org, New WPO Poll: Afghan Public Overwhelmingly Rejects al-Qaeda, Taliban, January 30, 2006, <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/155.php?nid=&id=&pnt=155&lb=bras> (accessed on 12 December 2007).

It's All About the Economy, Stupid

Though the employment of the previously addressed diplomatic, informational, and military recommendations will significantly improve Afghanistan COIN efforts, the U.S. must take a more active role in rebuilding Afghanistan's illicit opium-based economy versus supporting Afghan-United Kingdom led eradication efforts. This presents a difficult dilemma, as opium production directly supports both the insurgency and Afghanistan's agrarian population centers. It must be addressed to ensure the long-term economic viability and legitimacy of the Afghan government. President Karzai reinforces this premise stating that the opium trade "soils our honour, forces us to dampen our national pride, and makes us look incompetent in the eyes of the world."¹

Afghanistan possesses one of the world's most destitute people and ranks approximately 173 out of 178 countries in the basic index of human development, effectively putting it in a tie for last place with a few African countries."² 20-30 percent of the country's impoverished population satisfies its meager livelihood via the direct, indirect, or coerced support of illicit opium trade.³ This percentage equates to roughly 7,972,480 Afghan citizens. In spite of ongoing U.S., Afghani, and international counternarcotics efforts, 2006-2007 marked Afghanistan's largest poppy producing year,

¹ President Karzai, "Message from H.E. Hamid Karzai," the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, Kabul 2006

² Along with Somalia, Afghanistan is one of two countries in the world unable to produce accurate enough data to be ranked in UN Development Programme's annual Development Report. Using available data, however, Afghanistan's National Human Development Report 2004 estimated that Afghanistan would have ranked 173 out of 178, barely ahead of the African states of Chad, Mali, Burkina, Faso, Sierra Leone, and Niger. UNDP, Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004, http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/AFG_Afghanistan/afghanistan_2004_en.pdf.

³ Ibid.,5.

“accounting for 93 percent of the world’s illicit opium”⁴ and half of the country’s annual gross domestic product. Profiteers who have a vested interest in the continuance of poppy cultivation include narco-terrorists, financiers, war lords who likely supported the removal of the Taliban regime, and corrupt government officials. Farmers earn a paltry existence from poppy cultivation, but have little option but to grow it because of “salaam.” Salaam” allows farmers to secure loans [from narco-terrorists] to buy necessary supplies and provisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low as half their expected market value.”⁵ Though this appears on the surface to be a foolish undertaking, it provides farmers with “life insurance” against drought conditions which devastate Afghan’s poppy-growing lands. Making half of one’s expected profits is better than none. What will this large and influential segment of Afghan society do if their financial livelihood perishes as a result of Afghan and international eradication efforts? Will it force them to pursue legitimate means of income and become good stewards of Afghan citizenship, or will it cause them to become entrenched enemies of the government – opening up a second front in the Afghan war? Without a viable alternative livelihood option, the second response appears likely.

Eradication Efforts

“On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opium poppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April 2002. In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400 MT [metric tons] of opium...Since 2002, further government bans and

⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), “Afghan Opium Survey 2007,” Executive Summary.

⁵ Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Updated December 6, 2007,” CRS Report for Congress, 14.

stronger interdiction and eradication efforts failed to reverse an overall trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation and opium output...”

Not surprisingly, this failure resulted from violent farmer resistance to Afghanistan’s Central Poppy Eradication Force and a lack of governor and local authorities’ support in under-governed provinces.⁶ While eradication efforts realized a poppy reduction in areas governed by strong Afghan leadership with the assistance of United Kingdom and U.S. advisors, it did not impact the total production of Afghan opium. Notwithstanding, “U.S. officials emphasized in August 2007 the need for non-negotiated, equitable eradication to strengthen the effect of current efforts.”⁷

In defense of the Bush Administration, it has unveiled plans to strengthen counternarcotics (CN) efforts via the promotion of rural development, synchronizing COIN and CN efforts, and building political will. Furthermore, it has requested \$1.54 billion in CN assistance for Afghanistan and surrounding countries and plans to submit it in the President’s 2008 budget submission. If approved, the funding would include an emergency supplemental of \$120.0 million for USAID for much needed Alternative Livelihood Programs (ALP).⁸ While this is clearly a step in the right direction, the U.S. has a history of “underinvestment in Afghanistan – which gets less [U.S.] aid per year than any other state with a recent postconflict rebuilding effort...[to include Bosnia, East Timor, Eastern Slavonia, El Salvador, Haiti, Iraq, and Kosovo]”⁹ This is not to suggest that the U.S. has to contribute to the Afghan aid burden alone. The U.S. must persuade

⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁷ Ibid., 37.

⁸ The White House. “Emergency Supplemental & Additional Spending with Emergency Designations. FY 2008 Budget Summary.” http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/08budget/emergency_suppl.pdf (accessed 05 September 2007).

⁹ Rubin R. Barnett, “Saving Afghanistan”, Council on Foreign Relations, January/February 2007, Foreign Affairs Article.

its GWOT partners and G7 countries to contribute an appropriate percentage of their gross domestic income. With the exception of Canada and the United Kingdom, European countries have contributed less than their “equitable burden.”¹⁰

ALP’s and the Interdiction of Narco-Terrorists: A Long Term Solution

ALP’s offer farmers the chance for a better future whereas eradication efforts, in the short term, offer no future at all. However, if the farming community is not isolated from the coercion and brutality of narco-terrorists, ALP’s will be difficult to implement. Interdiction and ALP efforts are inextricably linked.

As of 2005, U.S. military forces received authorization to participate only in limited CN operations to include police training and interdiction mission support. Furthermore, they are undermanned to take on additive CN responsibilities. Notwithstanding, the U.S. can and must insist that the United Kingdom, in concert with Afghan CN forces, focus their efforts on targeting the narco-terrorists vice allocating precious resources in support of futile eradication activities. Furthermore, the U.S. must continue to increase support from its intelligence community and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to enhance interdiction operations. According to Rubin Barnett, a leading Afghanistan expert, “the U.S. DEA is working to compile cases against major traffickers that can be presented for extradition to the U.S...[but] The total number of such cases so far is only two or three and cannot increase quickly enough to make any appreciable

¹⁰ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistical Annex of the 2007 Development Co-operation Report http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34447_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed on 17 February 2008).

impact on the largest sector of the Afghan economy.”¹¹ Some argue that the U.S. should not become engaged in Afghanistan’s drug war at all, as it will detract from its COIN fight against AQAM fighters. This is a myopic view of the Afghanistan problem set, and avoids the critical link between the country’s illicit, opium based economy, the financing it provides to the insurgents, and the long-term economic stability and legitimacy of the Afghan Government the U.S. helped to create.

With respect to ALP’s, one must understand that the concept is easier to embrace than it is to execute. Take, for example, alternative crop initiatives. Though alternative crops offer a potential solution for farming communities with lands and climate conditions conducive for the growth of wheat, almonds, or other suitable crops, they are not a panacea for Afghan’s poppy dilemma. First, farmers can “typically make between 10 and 30 times as much growing opium poppies as they can any legal crop.”¹² Second, there are not enough fielded security forces in Afghanistan to protect the farmers who opt not to grow poppy. Though they may receive government compensation pay for growing alternative crops, that money means little if one’s life and his family’s is threatened by narco-terrorists. Third, Afghanistan does not possess adequate banking systems that can provide affordable and reliable credit, accurate accounting records, and “trustworthy system of forgiveness for opium denominated debts and mortgages...”¹³ Last,

¹¹ Rubin R. Barnett and Jake Sherman, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” Center on International Cooperation New York University, February 2008, 38.

¹² UNODC survey found that farmers could make only 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent as much growing wheat as they could growing poppies. UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, Counter Narcotics Directorate, Farmers’ Intentions Survey, 2003-2004, 35.

¹³ The *salaam* system of futures contracts is considered consistent with the Islamic prohibition of *riba*, or interest, because the creditor and debtor share the risk, which depends above all on the yield and price of the product, which neither can foresee when making the contract in advance of the harvest.

Afghanistan lacks established markets in which to capitalize on legal crops. Conversely, poppy crops offer guaranteed marketing.¹⁴ Alternative crop initiatives are challenging to be sure, but they can succeed if the abovementioned issues are adequately addressed. If not, Afghan farmers are unlikely to submit to their intrinsic value.

This argument is not to suggest that alternative crop initiatives offer the only ALP solution. U.S. and ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), in concert with USAID, have realized myriad successes with education, vocational, and cash-for-work programs in select Afghan provinces. The proliferation of these programs, however, is difficult as there are only 25 small PRTs in the entire country, and there is no unified chain of command to coordinate and synchronize efforts. Civilian agencies, domestic and international, often report directly to their respective embassies and capitols vice a PRT chain of command which should be well-nested within the Afghan government.

The initiatives listed above require a significant refocus of U.S. and international roles and responsibilities throughout Afghanistan. Increased economic aid, coupled with a weighted effort in support of ALP's and narco-terrorist interdiction operations (vice poppy eradication efforts), will enhance ongoing economic reforms and help set conditions for an economically viable Afghan government.

¹⁴ Jones and Pickering., 34.

Conclusion

Out of the dust, smoke, and carnage following the deadly 9/11 attacks on American soil, arose a change in U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. Limited military responses would serve little utility in deterring, dissuading, or defeating the global Islamic Revolutionary Movement which directly threatens the vital national interests of the U.S. and the free world. President Bush, with the support of Congress and the American people, determined that waging war against this threat offered the only viable solution to secure those interests and ensure his moral and statutory obligation to protect his citizens. This change in policy would first manifest itself in the destitute and distant country of Afghanistan from which al-Qaeda leadership, under the protection and hospitality of Taliban sanctuary, planned the deadliest single-day attacks on the American home front.

The decision to wage war in Afghanistan was rational and met the Just War Theory (JWT) and Jus ad Bellum criteria which helped to create conditions for domestic and international acceptance, endorsement, and tolerance of U.S. intervention. As an extension of U.S. political objectives nested in its NSS, JWT and Jus ad Bellum are more relevant today than at any time in the history of warfare. A violation of this theoretical framework would counter and undermine U.S. efforts to promote freedom, justice, and human dignity and the protection and proliferation of democratization. U.S. adherence of JWT, intensified by the grave threat posed by al-Qaeda, its objectives, and its unwavering ideology, present a clear argument for waging war in Afghanistan and committing national treasure – in terms of capital and bloodshed – to achieve strategic success. Strategic success is defined as the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the

establishment of a representative, stable Afghan Government which can provide for the security and well-being of its people – thereby denying al-Qaeda sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. once again.

Operational successes in the initial weeks of the Afghan war that were conducted by a relatively small but lethal U.S. footprint, coupled with an immediate change in political focus towards Iraq, precluded the U.S. from concentrating its elements of national power to achieve decisive results. This strategic blunder resulted in the resurgence of a determined insurgency, a protracted war, and an immature Afghan government that continues to vie for its survival. Though the Afghan government, U.S., and its coalition partners have produced myriad successes over the course of a six- year COIN struggle, there are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) efforts the U.S. must undertake to better set conditions for victory. Solutions include:

D:

- Ease India-Pakistan tensions surrounding Kashmir thereby creating conditions favorable to Pakistani denial of sanctuary in the FATA
- Persuade the Musharraf Administration to allow limited, clandestine U.S. operations in the FATA (near-term solution)
- As a GWOT partner, enhance ISAF efforts in Afghanistan to ensure success of its first employment outside the European continent. Persuade alliance to increase force levels, reduce national caveats, and increase national military defense spending, as practicable.

I:

- Incorporate the informational element of national power into the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- Ease democratization rhetoric and rely heavily on Muslims communicating with Muslim audiences. Engage international Islamic community, religious, and spiritual leaders.
- Engage the American people. Afghanistan has become a forgotten war. Keep U.S. citizens apprised of the enormous threat posed by al-Qaeda and current/projected initiatives to thwart that threat.

M: Provide a significant increase of U.S. and coalition troops commensurate with COIN doctrine and historical examples. One cannot wage a successful COIN campaign “on the cheap.”

E: Rebuild Afghanistan’s illicit, opium-based economy

- Redirect precious resources from futile eradication efforts to narco-terrorist interdiction operations and Alternative Livelihood Programs
- Secure the farmers who opt for these programs
- Increase U.S. economic aid and persuade allies to share an equitable burden.

The recommended challenges and solutions offered in this paper are not meant as a panacea, but simply propose that a failure to embrace and concentrate these DIME initiatives will lead to indecisiveness and the continuance of a deeply-rooted, protracted COIN campaign. The stakes of this war are high, and the U.S. must be willing to pay a high price. Thus far, Afghanistan has been relegated to an economy of force mission, and the U.S. has yet to concentrate its elements of national power thereby creating a precarious policy-resource mismatch in war that must be won.

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Colonel James E. Kraft Jr. graduated from Towson University in 1986 and received his commission through ROTC as an Infantry Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. COL Kraft began his Army career in the 1-27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii where he remained until 1990. His assignments included duty as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Scout Platoon Leader, and Company Executive Officer.

Upon completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1991, he was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) where he commanded Special Forces Operational Detachment-A (SFODA) 763 from 1992-1994. He subsequently served as adjutant of 2nd Battalion for seven months and then assumed command of Company C, 2nd Battalion where he served from 1994-1995. From 1995-1997, COL Kraft was selected for and served as a Joint Staff Intern in the J-3’s Special Operations Division followed by an assignment as the Special Operation Forces Personnel Systems Staff Officer on the Army Staff. Following these assignments, COL Kraft attended the Naval Command and Staff College at the Naval War College where he graduated with distinction in 1998. Following his graduation, COL Kraft returned to the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) where he remained until 2000. During his tenure, he commanded Company B, 1st Battalion and the Group Support Company, and later served as the Group Executive Officer. In November of 2000, COL Kraft was selected for and served as Speechwriter and, later, Aide-de-Camp to the 29th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army where he remained until 2003. Following this assignment, he Kraft served for one year as the Professor of Military Science and Leadership at McDaniel College located in Westminster, Maryland. In June of 2004, COL Kraft once again returned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and assumed command of its 3rd Battalion. During his command, he completed two operational deployments to Colombia, South America

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